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Original Parties [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291]: 
1. KaLvnn Ninow, 
Petitioner, 
M*» William Lowe; ^ # Augusta Rose; Hr# Robert Mortensen; and 
ZJm Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah corporation, 
Respondents. 
Augusta Rose, 
Third-party Petitioner, 
v. 
KaLynn Ninow, " • Ryan Pahl and / • Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-party Respondents. 
Additional party added by the trial court's URCP 42 order [April 15, 2004] 
consolidating two shareholder derivative actions during the pendency of the 
prior appeal [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]: 
O • Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah corporation, as relator in a 
shareholder derivative action against KaLynn Ninow to assert the rights of 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this 
matter, and as relator in a second shareholder derivative action against Ryan 
Pahl to assert rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, not a party to this matter, 
[formerly know, inter alia, as GHF Investments or GHF Investment 
Partnership], by and through its general partner, PahPs Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this action. Said shareholder 
derivate actions brought under Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case 
No. 030907064 were ordered consolidated April 15, 2004. (R. 1421-1424).] 
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HI 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
over the appeal transferred from the Supreme Court and jurisdiction under 
UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to 
"carry into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT App 291 "in aid 
of its [appellate] jurisdiction" over the District Court, Third Judicial District. 
Appellants5 brief was timely filed on April 26, 2006. This amended 
brief is filed pursuant to the orders of the Court of Appeals to file a new 
brief after multiple remands to the trial court to correct the record on appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Court of Appeals should carry into effect its September 2, 2004, 
Memorandum Decision in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahlV 2004 UT App. 
291, and vindicate its appellate jurisdiction over the Third District Court by 
reversing all interlocutory and final orders entered by the trial court after the 
trial court signed its Ruling and Order on April 26, 2005, [R. 2609], except 
for those portions of the Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition signed 
by the trial court on August 16, 2005, not being challenged on this appeal. 
Standard of Appellate Review - Because the trial court disregarded the law 
of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT App 291, 
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this is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
over the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to 
which the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA 
Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry 
into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its 
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court. 
Preservation of the Issue - Preserved at R. 1634. After Judge Medley 
entered a consolidation order consolidating two civil cases into this probate 
proceeding on April 15, 2004, while it was on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe I, 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose filed a Post-Consolidation Answer and 
Responsive Memorandum with URCP 7 Request to Submit Motion for 
Decision [R. 1634] and the Affidavit of William Lowe [R. 1637]. They 
alerted the trial court that KaLynn Ninow was arguing on appeal that the 
May 1, 2003, final order addressed only ownership of shares of stock and 
was arguing that claims for interests in real estate still remained pending in 
the trial court. [R. 1634] Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose indicated that they were 
not waiving their position that the May 1, 2003, judgment was not a partial 
summary judgment, but that it concluded the proceeding on the May 29, 
2002, petition as to both share ownership claims that had been litigated 
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without ever joining the necessary parties and real estate claims that could 
have been litigated, but were not litigated, and did not survive the May 1, 
2003, final order. [R. 1364] Ninow v. Lowe I was itself a consolidation 
of two appeals in which Ms. Ninow initially argued that there was no final, 
appealable order because, she argued, Judge Medley actually granted only 
partial summary judgment as to the portion of the claims dealing with the 
ownership of the 6,000 shares of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. ("Loan 
Office") and that the May 29, 2002, Probate Petition is still pending because 
the second portion of the claims, dealing with the ownership of certain State 
Street property, has yet to be adjudicated. The Court of Appeals reserved 
this question for plenary consideration. After the first appeal was filed, Ms 
Ninow approached the trial court and secured URCP 60(b)(1) relief in the 
form of the May 1, 2003, summary judgment based on "inadvertence" by 
arguing that she had "inadvertently" failed to submit it as a proposed order 
prior to the first notice of appeal. A second notice of appeal was filed, she 
conceded that the second notice of appeal was from a final, appealable order, 
and the two appeals were then consolidated. In rendering its memorandum 
decision in Ninow v. Lowe I [Estate of Pahl], 2004 UT App. 291, the Court 
of Appeals ruled that the appeal was from a "final, appealable order," as to 
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the entire consolidated appeal, thus creating the law of the case on the issue 
reserved for plenary consideration, rejecting KaLynn Ninow's contention, 
2. It was error for the trial court to remove William Lowe and Augusta 
Rose as officers and directors of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., in the 
final order signed August 16, 2005, [1] because this went beyond the scope 
of this court's remand in Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 
291 and [2] because there is no legal basis for their removal and they have 
the right to continue to serve as directors until their successors are qualified. 
Standard of Appellate Review - The issue presented for appellate review 
requires the Utah Court of Appeals to construe the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act on the question of whether it provides a statutory legal basis 
for judicial removal under this record. Such construction of a Utah statute 
presents a question of law as to which the Utah Court of Appeals gives no 
deference to the trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 
46, 122 P.3rd 556. Further, since the trial court disregarded the law of the 
case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291, by 
entering an order that exceeded the scope of the remand in that decision, this 
is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over 
the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to which 
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the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 78-
2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry into 
effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its 
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court. 
Preservation of the Issue - In her ruling and order of May 26, 2005 
[at R. 2789], the trial court makes a record that Mr. Lowe argued that the 
May 1, 2003, summary judgment did not preclude other individuals and 
entities from pursuing an ownership interest in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., shares. The issue was thus preserved. Mr. Lowe's argument 
was consistent with the law of the case established when Hon. Tyrone E. 
Medley, faced with a motion by Diamond Fork Land Company to dismiss 
the two shareholder derivative actions that had been consolidated into this 
proceeding based on Diamond Fork Land Company's transfer of all of its 
ownership interest in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., shares, dismissed 
without prejudice as moved for by Diamond Fork Land Company, rather 
than with prejudice, as moved for by KaLynn Ninow and Ryan Pahl. [Supp 
R. 376; Supp R. 385]. The purpose of that argument was to demonstrate that 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose had never been removed as officers and 
directors and that the court should not remove them under the Utah Revised 
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Business Corporation Act [1] because the May 1, 2003, summary judgment 
order was not binding upon Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.; its record 
shareholders on its official shareholder list; and their successors, who all 
have an interest adverse to the one claimed by KaLynn Ninow; [2] because 
the text in the body of the summary judgment order contained no language 
removing officers and directors, but only addressed share ownership; [3] 
because, by rule, the underlying finding of undisputed summary judgment 
fact that Lowe and Rose had been removed and replaced had never been 
incorporated into the summary judgment order itself [which contained no 
removal language] as an order and, by rule, such an undisputed summary 
judgment finding of fact for purposes of a May 1, 2003, summary judgment 
could not provide any basis for any order of removal on August 16, 2005, 
since, under URCP 7, 56, and former CJA 4-501, the summary judgment 
facts that are deemed undisputed are so deemed only for purposes of the 
summary judgment order itself and cannot form the factual basis for any 
other orderfs]; [4] because the summary judgment issue had never been 
litigated by the corporation, its record shareholders, and successors who 
claimed a voting interest adverse to Ms. Ninow's claims and who were not 
bound by the declination of the named parties to controvert the undisputed 
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material facts, since the named parties claimed no shareholder voting rights, 
were not agents of the record shareholders, and, in the case of William Lowe 
and Augusta Rose, were preliminarily enjoined by the court from litigating 
in a representative capacity as officers of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., and were never sued in their representative capacities; and, [5] because 
PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., by and through William Lowe, had 
given actual notice to KaLynn Ninow that he, as a corporate officer, acting 
on behalf of the corporation, had rejected the attempt by KaLynn Ninow to 
vote 100% of the shares, that he had done so based upon the corporation's 
official shareholder records that showed she lacked sufficient shares to form 
a quorum to unilaterally vote her shares, and that this rejection of her votes 
still stands because she has never challenged the rejection before a court of 
competent jurisdiction in a case to which PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., was made a party. The court rejected this argument as "convoluted" 
and "simply not credible" [R.2787], thereby preserving it, and, based upon 
that rejection, later signed the August 16, 2005, order on appeal, removing 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose as the officers and directors. [R. 3200] 
3. Because no cross-appeal was filed, and because no URCP 60(b) 
motion was filed in the trial court within three months of August 19, 2005, 
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the Court of Appeals should reverse only that portion of the final order now 
on appeal [R. 3200] that removes William Lowe and Augusta Rose as the 
officers and directors and should hold that they have never been removed or 
replaced. There should be no remand of the final order to the trial court. 
Standard of Appellate Review - Because this is an issue involving the 
management of the appeal, rather than an issue of appellate review of a trial 
court order, it presents a question of law for the appellate court, since this 
court has jurisdiction over the appeal. UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Preservation of the Issue - The issue was preserved by filing a notice of 
appeal [R. 3303] in the trial court, thus vesting this court with jurisdiction. 
4. Because no notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of November 
26, 2002, and because no URCP 60(b) motion was filed in the trial court 
within three months of November 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals should 
reinstate the November 26, 2002, default judgment in Civil No 020908627 
and reverse the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order setting aside that default 
judgment as an erroneous order improvidently entered by the trial court. 
Standard of Appellate Review - "Section 78-40-13 of the Utah Code 
governs default judgments in quiet title actions. It specifies that a default 
'judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the summons 
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and complaint who have been served.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-13 (2002). 
'The statute's plain language clearly provides that if a person is properly 
named in the summons and complaint and served, a default judgment is 
valid and conclusive against him or her.' " State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22; 
70 P.3d 111. This issue requires the Court of Appeals to construe Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-40-13 and to also construe the 3-month deadline under 
URCP 60(b). Construction of a rule or statute presents an issue of law as to 
which no deference is given to the trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. 
Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3rd 556. 
Preservation of the Issue - After the order of consolidation was entered on 
April 15, 2004, consolidating Civil No 020908627 into the May 29, 2002, 
probate petition proceeding then on appeal, William Lowe and Augusta 
Rose, having been involuntarily made parties to a consolidated proceeding 
over their objection, pled their Answer [R. 1634]. They pled that they 
"support the default judgment of November 26, 2002, because KaLynn 
Ninow did not timely respond to the summons. They support as correct 
Judge Hilder's bench ruling on May 2, 2003, that URCP 60(b) relief was 
unavailable to Ms. Ninow because she did not timely move for URCP 60(b) 
relief within the required three months. They object to Judge Hilder's 
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minute entry order of June 12, 2003, as incorrectly applying the holding in 
the case of Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63 
P.3rd 1008, because that case holding would apply here only if Ms. Ninow 
had diligently attempted to ascertain whether default had been entered and 
had been misled by the court. No such finding was made as to Ms. Ninow, 
who did not file her tardy response to the summons until the day default was 
entered and then took no steps during the next three months to see if default 
had been entered and did not file her URCP 60(b) motion based on 
inadvertence and mistake until after the three-month deadline under URCP 
60(b) for filing such motions. These respondents join in the pending motion 
dated July 2, 2003, to vacate the June 12, 2003, order setting aside the 
default judgment. Pursuant to URCP 7, they request decision on that 
motion." [R. 1635-1636] The trial court entered an interlocutory bench 
ruling denying the July 2, 2003, motion to vacate on April 6, 2005. [R. 2555 
- Minute Entry - "Mr.Copier makes a motion in regards to the ruling on 
6/12/03 be vacated. The court orders the motion to vacate is denied."] A 
final order was signed on August 16, 2005, and entered on August 19, 2005. 
A notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 2005, appealing the final 
order "together with all prior orders entered under or consolidated into this 
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probate that have not previously been reviewed on the merits by an appellate 
court, including, but not limited to, the order by Judge Hilder setting aside 
the default judgment, the order by Judge Lewis denying the motion to vacate 
the order by Judge Hilder setting aside the default judgment.. . ." [R. 3303] 
5. Because no cross-appeal was filed in Ninow v. Lowe L and because 
no URCP 60(b) motion was filed in Ninow v. Lowe I within three months of 
May 1, 2003, it was error and a violation of appellate law of the case for the 
trial court to exceed the scope of the remand in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of 
Pahll, 2004 UT App. 291, by ordering, on May 26, 2005, that the final, 
appealable order affirmed on appeal was only a "partial" summary judgment 
because real estate claims supposedly remained pending in the trial court and 
the preliminary injunction supposedly remained in effect. It was a violation 
of appellate law of the case to so "retroactively" extend the old preliminary 
injunction. It was also error to enter the May 26, 2005, order [as it was error 
to enter any of the other interlocutory and final orders on the merits after 
April 26, 2005], because the only matters pending before the trial court after 
April 26, 2005, were KaLynn Ninow's serial contempt motions and a court 
presiding over a contempt matter has no jurisdiction to enter orders on the 
merits and no right to enter contempt-type relief absent a contempt finding. 
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Standard of Appellate Review - Because Judge Lewis disregarded the law 
of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate ofPahD 2004 UT App 291, 
this is a matter of vindicating appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
over the Third District Court. As such, it presents a question of law as to 
which the Court of Appeals has express statutory jurisdiction under UCA 
Sec. 78-2a-3(l) and (2) to "issue all writs and process necessary" to "carry 
into effect" Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291 "in aid of its 
[appellate] jurisdiction" without giving any deference at all to the trial court. 
The question of whether the order [and similar orders entered after April 26, 
2005], exceeded the scope of the trial court's jurisdiction [because the only 
matters pending were Ms. Ninow's serial contempt motions, there was never 
an order entered finding anyone in contempt, and there was thus no basis 
upon which to enter any orders, let alone orders on the merits that exceed the 
scope of the relief available for contempt], presents a question of law as to 
which this court gives no deference to the trial court. Homever (In Re 
Cannatella) v. Stagg Associates. 2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284. 
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Counsel argues the 
order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show cause under 
advisement and will issue a written ruling.] [R. 2787 - (written ruling)] 
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[Appealed, Notice of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the interlocutory "orders 
and rulings extending the preliminary injunction beyond the grant in 2002 of 
the summary judgment adjudicating the underlying merits of the May 29, 
2002, probate petition."] 
6. Because William Lowe's motion to the court to set a hearing on the 
TRO undertaking and to give notice to the surety of the hearing fairly fell 
within the scope of the remand in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of PahD 2004 UT 
App 291, it was error for the trial court to deny the motion to set the hearing. 
Standard of Appellate Review - URCP 65A(c)(3) uses the discretionary 
word "may" but it also employs the word "shall" once the motion is filed. 
The discretionary "may" is the discretion of Mr. Lowe to move in the instant 
proceeding or, in the alternative, to file an "independent action" against the 
surety, or both, while the mandatory "shall" applies to the court in setting the 
hearing and in specifying what notice is to be given once the movant elects 
to proceed against the surety in the instant proceeding and it applies to the 
court clerk, as a ministerial officer, in the giving of such notice once such a 
hearing is set. The question before the court is a question of construction of 
URCP 65A(c)(3) and its mandatory language once, as in this case, a motion 
is filed, which is a question of law as to which no deference is given to the 
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trial court. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3m 556. 
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Mr.Copier argues 
the issue of the undertaking. Ms. Weeks gives opposing arguments. The 
court orders the motion for the undertaking is denied."] [Appealed, Notice 
of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the interlocutory "order denying the motion 
to proceed against the surety who made the TRO undertaking . . . ." ] 
7. The removal of the appellants as officer/directors on August 16, 2005, 
is a correct rendering of an erroneous underlying May 26, 2005, court ruling. 
Standard of Appellate Review - Since the trial court signed the August 16, 
2005, proposed order as submitted, it is a correct rendering of the underlying 
May 26, 2005, ruling. Since the underlying May 26, 2005, ruling was error 
because it exceeded the relief that was available in the contempt proceeding 
that was the only matter that survived the April 6, 2005, bench order, and no 
one was properly held in contempt, this is a de novo issue of lav/. Homever 
(In Re Cannatella) v. Stagg Associates, 2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284. 
Preservation of the Issue - [R. 2555 - Minute Entry - "Counsel argues the 
order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show cause under 
advisement and will issue a written ruling.] [R. 2787 - (written ruling)] 
[Appealed, Notice of Appeal, R. 3303 - appealing the "all prior orders . . . 
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that have not previously been reviewed on the merits by an appellate court.] 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES APPENDED HERETO 
UCA Sec. 16-1 Oa-809. Removal of directors by judicial proceeding. 
UCA Sec. 75-3-106. Scope of proceedings - Proceedings independent -
Exception. 
URAP 4(d). Additional or cross-appeal. 
URCP 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A formal petition within an informal probate was filed by KaLynn 
Ninow on May 29, 2002. The formal proceeding on that formal petition was 
concluded with a summary judgment on May 1, 2003. The Utah Court of 
Appeals decided that the May 1, 2003, summary judgment constituted a 
final, appealable order and affirmed it. Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 
2004 UT App 291. In that same decision, the Court of Appeals reversed a 
portion of an interlocutory contempt order that had held William Lowe in 
contempt of court and remanded for the limited purpose of ordering that the 
attorney fee award that Mr. Lowe had paid to Ms. Ninow be returned to Mr. 
Lowe. While that appeal was pending before the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley entered an order on April 15, 2004, consolidating 
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two civil shareholder derivative actions into this proceeding [See Ninow v. 
Lowe (Estate of Pahl\ 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]. After that appeal was 
decided, KaLynn Ninow began filing a series of serial contempt motions that 
were largely identical and based on the same subject matter and contentions. 
The trial court signed an order on April 26, 2005, [R.2609] in which it 
disposed of all matters arising out of the remand ordered in the prior appeal, 
all matters arising out of the two consolidated civil shareholder derivative 
actions that had been ordered consolidated during the prior appeal, and all 
matters arising out of the serial contempt motions filed to-date [with the 
conclusion that there had been no contempt by any alleged contemnors]. In 
an attempt to perpetuate the dispute, KaLynn Ninow continued to file more 
of her serial contempt motions and the trial court entered further orders after 
April 26, 2005, and entered the August 16, 2005 final order now on appeal. 
In contravention of the appellate law of the case established by this 
court and of her own law of the case established on April 26, 2005, the trial 
court erroneously ruled on May 26, 2005, that real estate issues supposedly 
remained pending before her under the May 29, 2002, petition. Having so 
erred, the court then signed a final order on the May 29, 2002, petition on 
August 16, 2005, that adjudicated only one additional matter on the merits of 
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the May 29, 2002, petition beyond that which was contained in the earlier 
May 1, 2003, final order. That one additional matter was the judicial 
removal of William Lowe and Augusta Rose as officers and directors of 
PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation. This is challenged 
on appeal because [1] the proceeding on the May 29, 2002, petition was 
concluded with the May 1, 2003, order and it was error and a violation of the 
appellate law of the case established in Ninow v. Lowe [Estate of Pahll, 
2004 UT App. 291 to reopen it and remove William Lowe and Augusta 
Rose as officers and directors when the only matter before the court was a 
contempt proceeding; [2] there was no legal basis under the Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act to remove William Lowe and Augusta Rose as 
officers and directors; and, [3] instead of fostering a trial court litigation 
environment in which proper parties were brought before the trial court and 
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits, the court employed 
contempt and injunctive powers as well as various rulings, orders, and 
judicial comments to "chill" and "discourage" parties and potential parties. 
This appeal presents a strange procedural posture because, on more 
than one occasion, KaLynn Ninow failed to appeal, cross-appeal, or move 
under URCP 60(b) within three months, but was still able to get a trial court 
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to grant URCP 60(b)-type relief. This strange procedural posture has been 
exacerbated by KaLynn Ninow's excessive preoccupation with the attorney 
for the respondents and her attempts to show that he is in bad faith and in 
contempt, rather than focusing on the law, the facts, and the legal merits. 
While all of the orders and rulings entered after April 26, 2005, were 
error because the only matters pending before the court were Ms. Ninow's 
serial contempt motions and there was, thus, no jurisdiction to enter orders 
on the merits [and, since no one was found to be in contempt, there was also 
no basis for ordering contempt-type relief either], the appellants challenge 
only a portion of the final order of August 16, 2005. Since no Rule 60(b) 
motion was filed within 3 months and no cross-appeal was filed, portions of 
the August 16, 2005, final order not being challenged on appeal will stand 
even though a timely challenge might have caused the order to be reversed. 
FACTS 
1. On August 15, 2000, KaLynn Ninow filed a petition for formal 
adjudication of intestacy and formal appointment of personal 
representative. [R.1] 
2. On September 16, 2000, the August 15, 2000, petition was concluded 
by an order making the appointment and adjudicating that Gary Pahl 
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died intestate. [R.18] [See UCA Sec. 75-3-106(d)] [the proceeding 
was "concluded by an order making or declining the appointment."] 
No other petition SCCKHI^ . U iiiiui xuxici w as filed until Ma> 29, 2002 
,: i i 
iMMUM'ship il l ili.irrs of slut I mind inluvsl,0 in IIHMI! < il;ilr | h1 II '«11| 
Xhe May 29, 2002, petition yielded two orders on the merits: 
\„. A n August 20, 2002, interlocutory order dismissing Robert K. 
Mortensen with prejudice and ordering him to submit his resignation 
a^  an < nceram; , . J U U , O; *\U:, ' . , _ . , . ., . ^ Inc , 
interlocutory order was entered ordering William Lowe and Ati- t^a 
Rose i •_* A Mini their resignations and file it with ihc court and there 
was no language in any interlociitory order prior to May 1 2003. or in 
the I II ia I oi dei entned on May 1 2003, that judicially removed them.] 
Illllll , I Li1, II , 110 I inula ' ivliiiu Ii (tinlnni,, iHl i iul^rd, .mil (In i r n l IIIII.il 
the motion for sumniar judgment tiled by the personal representative 
of the estate of Gary Pahl was granted and that uaiy Pahl was the 
owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., at the time of his ucaii., aim ail o\ saiu -J.M.W ,nares are part of 
Ill; 5 • - • • 
the property belonging to the Estate of Gary Pahl, and Ryan Pahl as 
the only devisee of the estate. [R.1114] The May 1, 2003, order was a 
"final, appealable order" affirmed appeal in Ninow v. Lowe [Estate of 
Pahl], 2004 UT App 291. During the pendency of the appeal of the 
May 1, 2003, order, the trial court entered an order of consolidation 
on April 15, 2004, by which it consolidated two civil cases into the 
May 29, 2002, petition. [Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case 
No. 030907064.] [R. 1421] The [1] remand of an interlocutory order 
of contempt that was reversed on appeal; [2] litigation of the two civil 
cases that were consolidated into this matter during the prior appeal; 
and; [3] order on contempt motions pursued by Ms. Ninow, were the 
subject of an order signed by the trial court on April 26, 2005, that 
expressly stated "this shall constitute the final order as to all claims 
and all parties to any and all proceedings under this probate number.'9 
[R. 2609] After signing this order on April 26, 2005, the trial court 
erroneously entertained further of Ms. Ninow's contempt motions that 
were based upon the very allegations that had been disposed-of by the 
order of April 26, 2005, and erroneously signed interlocutory orders 
up to September 15, 2005. A final order was signed August 16, 2005. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
•1. 4 11. of the legal issues raised on appeal can be decided in... favor of the 
appellants W Illiairi. I .owe and Augusta Rose by appl) ing the law of the case. 
2. liciaiiM1 Kill ) mi IJiiiniw did mil ti|>|H,MII \ i iiilllllliiiii Hhih\ s al Nmniill i 
''In,, MIIII/ in lunch mnu v ilhin fhrcv inonlhs under I l|<( 4P(>0(li) \hv iiiinirl 
should reverse the June 12, 2003, order that set aside the Default Judgment. 
3. Because KaLynn Ninow did not cross-appeal within the time allowed 
and also did noi mm h i^r^-r within 3 months of August 19, 2005, for relief 
u n t i e , >- . . -\ i - • ; . ! • - L I L I 
n i l • l ' 
the August 16, 2005, final order ordering the removal of officers/directors. 
4. Ihe trial court should have held .-. hearing on the $20,000 undertaking. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One - Law of the case should be applied to decide this appeal. 
< 
shares of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., at the time oi ins 
death and that they are part, of his estate being probated in the Third District 
Court that was affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), ?0fU 
! J I \pp 291, did not vest the personal representative with title to the shares 
free of adverse claims and liens [because no published notice of the action 
was given under Titles 75 or 78 of the Utah Code] and did not vest her with 
the legal right to vote those shares [because Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., was never made a party to the action, it has the right to designate its 
record shareowners entitled to vote subject to judicial review by a court of 
competent jurisdiction in an action to which the corporation is a party, and 
this was not such an action, nor was it a party to this action]. Thus, the legal 
title to 3000 of the shares that was extinguished in the November 26, 2002, 
Default Judgment against her and quieted in favor of out-of-state owners is 
also not free of adverse claims and liens. It is only free of all adverse claims 
and liens asserted by her. The title remains out-of-state beyond the in rem 
jurisdictional reach of Utah courts and the purpose of getting the Default 
Judgment reinstated on this appeal is to preclude her from trying to sue any 
of the current out-of-state owners. This is consistent with the moderately 
sophisticated business succession planning done by the late Gary G. Pahl, 
who had no desire to have his estranged ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow, control the 
corporation and did not desire to turn it over to his son, who was too young 
to have demonstrated whether or not he had any aptitude to run a pawn shop 
and, who, as de facto owner since May of 2002, has shown he lacks such an 
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aptitude, as the pawn shop is now temporarily closed. He will be better ofr 
as a 50% shareholder and ordinary creditor of the corporation as it pursues 
its legal claims and resumes operations once its officers and a quorum <. .. : 
dun-dors, (ip(K-lLiinl i Willi.iiii I H\H i ml \ii),u ilii I in .<! , in in s11IHI• <«iI lu iifli- i 
thi 01 igl; rtl lis appeal Pa\ v i :t lending is a specialty i lie 1 ic business that requires 
a specialized skill set. Some people have what it takes to be good at it and 
some people don't have what it takes, Because no successors have ever 
been qualified, William... I ,owe and Augusta Rose, as a. quorum of directors.,,, 
suceesoium . ........,.;. corporal 
lawsuits were commenced that arc now part of the consolidated proceeding 
that is now on appeal. The first of these lawsuits was a UCA Sec, 75-3-106 
probate proceeding initiated by KaLynn Ninow as the petitioner on May 29, 
because she did mil |om I'alil
 t» Sail I'alaci I oaii IIIdec, Inc., as a 
ncccssan and indispensable pailv, a f.haie cluiinanl !r a beneficial intcicl in 
shares transferred by shareholders of record, Diamond Fork Land Company, 
filed separate shareholder derivative-actions, one against KaLynn Ninow as 
personal representative and one against Ryan Pahl as the late Gary Pahl's 
son. and sole heii A significant bod) ol Lrv\ of the case has since developed. 
«! I - • 
Ms. Ninow's May 29, 2002, petition was concluded with a May 1, 
2003, final order that declared that all 6000 shares of Pahfs Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc., had belonged to Gary Pahl at death and were part of his 
estate. While this made KaLynn Ninow the proper defendant as personal 
representative in a shareholder derivative suit, it did not make her a record 
shareholder entitled to vote, because Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., 
was not a party, its officers and directors were not sued in any kind of 
representative capacity, but were, instead, preliminarily enjoined from 
binding the corporation, and it is the corporation that has the legal right to 
designate its record voting shareholders subject to judicial review by a court 
of competent jurisdiction in a case to which the corporation is a party. The 
May 1, 2003, judgment was affirmed on appeal. That affirmation means 
Ms. Ninow was the proper defendant in the shareholder derivative suit but 
did not give her a right to vote shares because the corporation is not bound. 
Meanwhile, one of the shareholder derivative actions concluded with 
a final order of Default Judgment on November 26, 2002. It was set aside 
on June 12, 2003. Both actions were then dismissed without prejudice after 
they had been consolidated into this proceeding. Because the dismissals 
without prejudice occurred after consolidation, they were not final orders as 
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to all claims and all parties and William Lowe and '\iiuusta Rose still had 
the right, to pursue the motion to set aside the June 12, 2003, order in which 
they had joined. ' I he trial coin t denied that motion in at i interlocutor) bend 1 
tti'ili/i i in A| il " , "(III i, ,i I ui I i fi.nl i-l llii . appnJ III lismiss.Ns wilhoul 
prej i idice. the enti ) of a I\ la^  r 1 2003, final order, and 'the entry of Default 
Judgment on November 26, 2002, that is now ripe for reinstatement, on this 
:tpi'-cai, all make up the fabric that is law ^Hh case. T aw of the case ^ of 
particular importance in rruiei title at uwii^  such a,> die one that resulted in the 
V c ember . . . - • - . , **. .. . • .••.:. - ' . • '. \ . • 
interested in the property, the 3-month deadline undci LRCP 60(b) pla\ s a 
very important role in setting a firm date after which ihc court that quieted 
title through a Default Ju.dgm.ent will not disturb it, ' I ha t date came and... 
went.here and is pail o! (lie lain K* oi the I.in i I llic viuv lluil should inn1 IK 
taken inlii" .in mint fit i lHrrmininf, wliclhtT il v its rrfniir*m;; lu, ,w.'.^  ^r\ml%\ 
set the November 26, 2002, Default J udgment aside on June 12, 2003, or 
w hether that, judgment should now be reinstated, a s discussed in Point Two. 
The June 12, 2003, order was referred to in the prior appeal in a reply 
brief and. in the decisioi I | n. 101, but * as not yet before thi;^,* , ,. ^ «ow 
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Point Two - The Court of Appeals should reverse the June 12, 2003, sua 
sponte order that erroneously set aside the November 26,2002, default 
judgment and hold that the said November 26,2002, default judgment 
stands as the Final Order in Civil Case No. 020908627 and that it is 
"valid and conclusive" against KaLynn Ninow and against the estate. 
Because the final, appealable order that was affirmed on appeal in 
Ninow v, Lowe (Estate of Pahl) 2004 UT App 291, did not include as parties 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and 50% of its record shareholders and 
their successors [KaLynn Ninow, as the personal representative, was record 
legal shareholder of only 50% of its shares], Diamond Fork Land Company, 
an equitable successor, filed two "independent action[s]" [See LfRCP 60(b)]: 
[1] A shareholder derivative action to enforce the rights of Pahl's Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc., against KaLynn Ninow; and, [2] A second such derivative 
action to enforce the rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, by and through its 
sole-surviving partner, Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., against Ryan 
Pahl. It did so because the corporation's officers and directors, William 
Lowe and Augusta Rose, had not been sued in their official representative 
capacities and were also prevented by the threat of a preliminary injunction 
from asserting the rights of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., beyond the 
rejection of KaLynn Ninow's votes Mr. Lowe gave notice he had officially 
performed on behalf of the said corporation as a corporate officer during the 
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interim period between the expiration of the TRO and the bench ruling 
granting the preliminai ;j injunction [based on the i ight of Pahl's San ru.ace 
I O i l I I I H V l l ' L ' . I l l l I l l i i ' j U I l l U U l l i k ' S t o i W J i l t l l I I I II J] 1III I II III II II II l l M l S u l l l l l III1 Il II 
shareholder recor ds ] Fhe purpose of the two shareholder derh rative actions 
was to, in the bi ight light of day, bring civil actions [of which the pei sonal 
representative and the sole heir would both have actual notice as defendants] 
to assert the rights ol Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.,, to be adjudicated. 
111 c s 11 * 11111 n i I  i Iv 1 c 11 • 11 \ 11 (i s (," . 11" l i o n a >.» a n i s I 1 \ II s,, Ml i n :) .,- in t ol eel 3 000 
sluiivs OUT whu h she hid iiamlh sauudi i UIIHIMI S nidpinciil, Because 
she did not join Pahl's Salt x « ^ ^ Loan Office, Inc., as a party, the "May" 
and "December" agreements referred to in the prior appeal were never fully 
adjudicated The judgment aifirmed on appeal was based on a si ipposedly 
scrcndip... ,. . - i*e agieeineiiL * , .., . _ u i:ui , .„*. ...; .., 
i 
freed irom injunction bo llie^ would present its defense 1 1 1 c l l l l l l l UJLJLW tion-iree 
environment rather'than'this hair-trigger contempt environment, they, as the 
officers, would have caused the corporation to make its slun v K mry's 
iniciil lis exposed in hv Ma) iiitlll I It/eeiiilin i nniliada was completed 
while (iarv \ms ihu \v\ iiiiliili/ IIIIIJJ maun uit'ddi hi III'.IIMII a( >| Mill! mil - nn I .i 
summary judgment motion in which they had no personal interest because 
they claimed no shares. Surprisingly, Ms. Ninow did not timely respond to 
the summons and then, after a Default Judgment was entered on November 
26,2002, she failed to timely move for URCP 60(b) relief within 3 months. 
Since this was a quiet title action involving 3000 shares of the 6000 
shares that the probate court had ordered were owned by Gary Pahl at the 
time of his death and were part of his estate [an order that was affirmed on 
the prior appeal], she was the proper defendant in her capacity as personal 
representative, because the informal probate remained open and the shares 
remained subject to probate claims and administration. In entering the said 
Default Judgment, the trial court ordered: "All of defendant's claims to 
3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the legal and beneficial title 
to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the plaintiffs successors 
to those shares as set forth in the case record as follows: . . . ." [Emphasis 
added.] The Utah Supreme Court held in 2003: "Section 78-40-13 of the 
Utah Code governs default judgments in quiet title actions. It specifies that a 
default 'judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the 
summons and complaint who have been served.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-
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13 (2002) The statute's plain language clearly provides that if a person is 
properly name*' - »c summons and complaint and served, a defai ll t 
. /_U * , :C V . 1 l a i l l l l lU l i , 
• * *mondFo4 i iwnl t \nnpmx w.r- n\\\y 
a beneficial ow ner, and because the legal title was [at the same time that all 
of the personal representative's claims were extinguished] quieted in favor 
of out-of-state legal owners who were not parties to the case or to the T — 
12, 21)03, oi der setting aside the November zo, zvuz, ueraun »- \ . w <t 
oi dei :ii :!! mil iir vrsl lir i(i\liii|.'iirJn.Ml lqj;)l lilli h n II, in I I » 
j e g a | t j t j e t | i a t j i a ( | ^ e e l l quieted in favor of the out-of-state owners bv ibo 
November 26, 2002, order was, from and after the date of entry of that o i _ , 
beyond, the in rem jurisdictional reach of the Utah courts. The out-of-state 
owners in wn*,.. ai title was nun .*-u were not parties, so there was no 
; ' J"! Ill 
was error, il had no iegal effect on lei'a1 \ •-?::. - * - • * .knvv w hich 
was out-of-state beyond the court's jurisdiction and remains out-of-state. 
The reversal of the June 12, 2003, order is sought because that order 
was error and reversing n win eliminate an\ iw;.*; >asis KaLynn N inow 
might liiiw lnrlrviii|' (uMiiiiilM llu mil nl-slak1 invniTs parlies (o an action. 
Lowe and Rose have no control over or contract with those owners. 
But as long as those owners desire to have Lowe and Rose remain in 
office as a quorum of directors, they can keep them there simply by making 
sure that, as the owners of legal voting title to 50% of the shares, they never 
appear at any shareholder meeting, thereby thwarting a shareholder quorum. 
Lowe and Rose will continue to serve due to the lack of successors. 
A court of competent jurisdiction might eventually be able to come in 
and intervene, but no legal action has ever been brought or pled to do this. 
After initially denying Ms. Ninow's URCP 60(b) motion for failing to 
bring it within the required 3 months [Ms. Ninow was asserting all manner 
of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, misconduct by her adversary, 
fraud on the court, and the like, which are, of course, all subject to the three 
month deadline in the rule], Judge Hilder, in a sua sponte order entered on 
June 12, 2003, granted it. [Supp R.302] ["This court has this daty entered a 
Ruling and Order in case No. 020908627 granting defendant's motion in that 
case to set aside the default judgment."] It was clearly error to grant a 60(b) 
motion not filed within 3 months of November 26,2002. The 2-1 decision 
in Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63 P.3rd 
1008, provides no basis for disregarding the 3-month deadline. Unlike the 
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"unique" facts in Oseguera, Ms. Ninow was not "affirmatively misled" hy 
T
 i1 c T-Tilder either about the entry of the Default J udgment or alnua iin -
of the entiy ( >f the Default Judgment. See Swart \ . State, 200 11 ) I App 209. 
Appdhilr if\nsNiI ill (In1 hull I "', .MMM, ,mlrr sdliiifj aside (lit; I Vliiull 
Judfjjiienl si i«i Hi in lii I mm be ordered for the legal reasons the motion to set aside 
the Default Judgment was opposed in 'the trial com ti [1] the trial court had 
no jurisdiction to set the Default Judgment aside because Ms. Ninow did not 
iile her motion within the required .* ihouuis.
 (~ i ^ •-•now never ottered 
tin cuuse l(»i (hi" Liitlini i. nil . i - ill-in I,1, 
nplaint* Ms. Ninow -\v * —-. - •*!-,-•/ -t^isiblr 
m e r i t to 'the claims for relief pled against her. Erickson v. S h ^ ^ ^ii. 
Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147 (I Jtah 1994). [Cited and aruued to the trial court 
- - - Temoramhiiij HI upputKSiiioii *on by DeKssdant to Set 
* - *• . I iA 
As in 'the case at bar, responsive papers filed by defendant in Erickson 
• *l! - ared in the case file between the time the default dertificate was entered 
nriCi iIK. utile iiK ui i.it11. i. uIsment was enters t, J11stice Durham wrote 
lli.il NIL dUeiidiiiil vv.'ts si i II requiied lo lilc I lie IIIOIKIII ID ,et aside within I 
months. The 2-1 Oseguera decision by the Court of Appeals obviously did 
not reverse the unanimous Erickson decision by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Further, it was error to set aside the Default Judgment because Ms. 
Ninow offered no excuse for her seriously tardy response to the summons 
and complaint and, significantly, offered no defense of at least ostensible 
merit. The sole defense raised in her responsive motion was that the rulings 
and orders entered in the probate proceeding initiated by her May 29, 2002, 
petition had preclusive effect upon the shareholder derivative action. This 
defense had no ostensible merit at all because the August 26, 2002, summary 
judgment ruling that later ripened into the May 1, 2003, order did not, on its 
face, purport to grant share ownership that was free of all adverse claims and 
liens, did not, on its face, purport to grant any legal voting rights as a record 
shareholder, and, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant any such relief 
because the corporation was not joined as a party, not all legal successors to 
its "shareholders of record" were joined as parties, and no formal published 
notice was given under Titles 75 or 78 of the Utah Code under which those 
non-parties were bound. When that defense was later litigated on the merits 
it was rejected by Judge Medley, who ordered dismissal without prejudice 
instead of with prejudice, rejecting the defense of preclusion on the merits. 
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Mi; *;t <-i-d hereto are copies of some of the filings in opposition to the 
June 12. °0P^ order that were filed both before it was entered and after it 
was entered sua sponte. [R.40J~
 t , o ^ 
ii Hii'orpoi.ilnl hnvm lib iilllli In • IIIOM lli.il I he1, \\r\r uii'.i'd in (IK I I I . I I mil 
and as arguments on appeal in support of iTva\itl Aim jppericlnl hereto is 
Judge Hilder's June 12, 2003, sua.sponte order. [R. 4053-4056] Reversal is 
now sought on appeal ^ 'ML i*• th.*i ^ixn,\ 'I * oi rectly orders that "as to 
the first three subsection^ ^ -r e limit is three 
no discretion to extend that time." The trial com! should have stopped there 
and simph KI Jed the motion to set aside the November 26, 2002, I )ef 
• t - s i t c i o u s n v , t ' t i l icu. isi^tcau, the trial court concluded that Oseguera 
* p i n \ ides ii cle.n hisirs I'm i r h i f l In iiiiii IIlit" dc l i iu l l iiiiNiiiiiiiiilliiMiiiiihiuiiil sepuiate l i o m 
grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections " The I••• • • I 
court then tried to make the facts of this case fit into Oseuuera hs reasoning 
that the entn of the Default Certificate "arose solely from court error." But 
if even ; , - * ourt erroi u> enter the default, that "court error" was fully 
remediable under URCP 60(b)(1). See Erickson, supra. Further, had Ms. 
Ninow timely responded to the summons, her default would not have been 
sought or entered and it was clear error on this record to conclude that it was 
entered "solely" due to such "court error" [if any]. The June 12, 2003, order 
contains no finding or conclusion that Judge Hilder "affirmatively misled" 
Ms. Ninow about the fact or date of entry of the November 26, 2002, Default 
Judgment, as required under Oseguera and Swart, supra, which require that 
a twice-tardy party such as Ms. Ninow [who blew both the 20-day summons 
deadline and the 3-month 60(b) deadline] must actually be "affirmatively 
misled" about the entry of the default judgment and/or date thereof. And it 
must be the trial court that does the affirmative misleading. Here, the June 
12, 2003, order concludes only that the 3-month deadline under URCP 60(b) 
"was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent this was because 
plaintiff did not give prompt notice of the judgment." In fact, the Notice of 
Judgment [R.3898] was served by mail on December 17, 2002, and gave 
notice that the Default Judgment had been "entered herein on November 26, 
2002" and an actual signed copy of the Default Judgment was appended to 
that Notice of Judgment. [R. 3899] Ms. Ninow then had over two months to 
comply with the 3-month deadline. Nothing in the June 12, 2003, order or in 
-34-
the record as supplemented contends Ms. Ninow's counsel did not receive 
the Notice of Judgment. This court should not consider such a contention if 
it is raised on appeal. Swart v. State, supra, citing Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 
11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) [*5] (stating appellate 
courts will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal). 
The June 12, 2003, order claims that the trial court had authority to 
"reconsider" the law of the case created by its initial denial of the URCP 
60(b) motion on May 2, 2003, as time-barred under "Thurston v. Box Elder 
County and Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies" because "no final judgment 
has entered based on the court's bench ruling of May 2, 2003." [R.4053] 
The trial court's analysis is incorrect. The final order is the November 
26, 2002, Default Judgment. The May 2, 2003, ruling denied a motion to set 
that final order aside. The June 12, 2003, order states the trial court is "still 
persuaded" that said May 2, 2003, ruling was correct as to "motions under 
60(b)(6) that could be brought pursuant to one of the first three subsections" 
and Ms. Ninow's motion could be brought pursuant to URCP 60(b)(1), (2), 
or (3). The trial court's "critical point" that the "defendant had not 'failed to 
plead or otherwise defend' [Rule 55(a)], at the time default was sought" and 
that therefore the clerk "was not empowered to enter the default" [R.4054] 
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cannot be sustained on appeal. The sua sponte finding that the default was 
sought after Ms. Ninow had filed her responsive motion was made without 
giving the parties notice that the trial court thought this was a "critical point" 
and without taking evidence or holding a hearing. In light of the lack of any 
evidence or hearing, there is no evidence that can be marshaled in support of 
the trial court's "critical point." The only evidence on the "critical point" is 
the Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier [R.4059] which establishes that default 
was not sought after defendant had filed her responsive motion, but that the 
application and motion for entry of default in the form of a proposed Default 
Judgment was actually submitted to the downstairs civil clerks at the Scott 
M. Matheson courthouse "several days before the clerk entered the default 
certificate on November 25, 2002." Since Ms. Ninow's responsive motion 
was belatedly filed on November 25, 2002, two-and-a-half weeks after the 
November 8, 2002, deadline for filing it, the default "was sought" several 
days before she filed her responsive motion, not "after" she had filed it. And 
the conclusion by the trial court that this was a "critical point" is error. The 
"critical" [and jurisdictional] "point" is that Ms. Ninow failed to file under 
URCP 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) within 3 months and a "court error" [if there was 
one] constituted a 60(b)(1) court "mistake" subject to the 3-month deadline. 
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In the moving papers in which appellants joined after involuntarily 
becoming parties through case consolidation, it was argued that because the 
June 12, 2003, order set aside a default judgment that had extinguished legal 
title of defendant and quieted it in favor of out-of-state non-parties, it may be 
of some interest to national title insurers who rely on that 3-month deadline. 
If this court has any inclination towards affirming the June 12, 2003, 
order, then some amicus briefing should be invited by this court from some 
representative sample of large national title insurers who may be impacted 
by such an appellate decision. Because title insurance profit margins are so 
bloated because the statutory franchises under which title insurers operate 
disconnect their fees from the underlying actuarial risk, they may see such 
an appellate decision as an aberration in Utah about which they care little. 
But they ought to at least be given that opportunity [in the event this 
court believes there is legal basis for sustaining the June 12, 2003, order]. 
Point Three - All rulings and orders entered by the trial court 
between the signing of the April 26,2005, Ruling and Order and the 
filing of the Notice of Appeal on September 15,2005, should be reversed 
as erroneous except for matters in the Final Order signed on August 16, 
2005, that are not being challenged on appeal. The trial court should be 
ordered to entertain no matters as to which the April 26,2005, order isf 
law of the case and ordered to entertain only matters remanded in the 
decision on this appeal or reserved in the August 16,2005, order. The 
removal of appellants as officers/directors of PahPs Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., via the August 16,2005, Final Order should be reversed. 
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Point One above demonstrates that this appeal can be decided in the 
appellants' favor by applying law of the case. Point Two above shows that 
the June 12, 2003, order [which was referred to in the prior appeal at n.10 as 
not yet before the court, but now is] was erroneous because the November 
26, 2002, Default Judgment did not constitute a court error and even if it did 
it was a "mistake" that had to be timely remedied under 60(b)(1), (2), or (3). 
This gets us to the orders erroneously entered by the trial court after 
the reversal and remand in the prior appeal. Because, in her filings in May 
of 2002, Ms. Ninow had alleged all manner of forgery, embezzlement, and 
malfeasance in the operation of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., none of 
which that was then ever made part of the final order, and because Mr. Lowe 
and Ms. Rose were not proper parties to the motion for summary judgment 
because they personally claimed no ownership of any shares adverse to Ms. 
Ninow's claims, one of their primary objectives was to put up mere token 
resistance so as to get the final, appealable order as soon as possible and to 
have this court decide on the appeal of that final, appealable order that it 
was, indeed, an appeal from a final, appealable order and that there were no 
real estate issues reserved in the trial court. The issue of whether or not Mr, 
Lowe and Ms. Rose had succeeded in securing the May 1, 2003, order as the 
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final order on all the claims pled in the May 29, 2002, petition, and not just 
the share ownership claims, was duly framed by Presiding Judge Norman H. 
Jackson in the Order of October 28, 2003, in the prior appeal. ["Appellee 
also contends that the first notice of appeal was not filed from a final, 
appealable order because the district court has not ruled on the ownership of 
real property;9 "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the 
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the appeal is taken 
from a final, appealable order.99] Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose prevailed on this 
point in the prior appeal decision. "As an initial matter, we have determined 
that Respondents' appeal is taken from a final, appealable order.99 Ninow v. 
Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291.1 Accordingly, after the prior 
1
 If the Court of Appeals had decided otherwise and had held that there were 
still real property issues pending before the trial court, Mr. Lowe would have 
personally litigated them after the remand. Mr. Lowe has been candid about 
the fact that PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., in 2000, contracted to pay 
his attorney fees incurred in his dealings with KaLynn Ninow and pledged 
the real and personal property that it controlled to secure that contract, and 
any order on the merits of any real estate claims would have had to consider 
that claim. As it stands, while Ms. Ninow, in May of 2005, persuaded Judge 
Lewis that there were still real property issues pending in the trial court, no 
final order deciding the merits any real estate claims was ever entered below. 
Ms. Ninow9s argument that such claims remained pending is contradicted by 
Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291; by an order duly signed 
April 26, 2005, which disposed of everything that had been pending; by Ms. 
Ninow9s filing dated July 8, 2005 [R.3080] asserting that only contempt of 
court issues remained; and by the Final Order signed on August 16, 2005, 
based on that July 8th filing. No real estate issues have survived those orders. 
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appeal was decided, the only matters before the trial court were [1] matters 
that had been remanded; [2] the two civil cases that had been consolidated 
during the appeal; and, [3] the contempt motions that Ms. Ninow had begun 
to file as a serial filer of contempt motions. After the interlocutory bench 
order on April 6, 2005, and the Ruling and Order signed April 26, 2005, 
everything done after April 26, 2005, through the filing of the Notice of 
Appeal on September 15, 2005, should be reversed, except for the matters in 
the order signed on August 16, 2005, that are not being challenged on appeal 
by the appellants. Since all the matters that had either been remanded or 
consolidated had been disposed of by the close of the trial court's bench 
order of April 6, 2005, the only matter remaining for decision after April 6, 
2005, was alleged contempt, which was disposed of in the Ruling and Order 
of April 26, 2005. Since no one was found to be in contempt, there was no 
basis for entering any orders. And even if someone had been found to be in 
contempt, there was no basis for entering any orders going to "the merits." 
Because the trial judge in this case who erroneously entered orders on 
"the merits" from April 26, 2005, through September 15, 2005, even though 
the only matters pending were contempt matters, [Hon. Leslie A. Lewis], is 
the same judge who was later reversed on appeal in another case for doing 
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the same thing in that case [Homever (In Re Cannatella) v. Stage Associates, 
2006 UT App. 89; 132 P.2d 284], perhaps Judge Lewis simply made an 
overly optimistic appraisal of the scope of her own contempt powers and the 
correction that this court made in that case should also be made in this case. 
If this court, on that basis, reverses everything done between April 26, 
2005, and August 16, 2005; the portion of the order signed August 16, 2005, 
that is being challenged; and everything done after signing of that Final 
Order through the filing of the Notice of Appeal on September 15, 2005, this 
court may not need to reach the substantive errors in the interlocutory orders 
and in the challenged portion of the Final Order signed August 16, 2005. It 
is sufficient to note here that these orders that went beyond the scope of the 
contempt matter were also erroneous on the legal merits in important ways. 
2
 The errors, include, inter alia: [1] disregarding appellate law of the case by 
ordering in May of 2005 that a preliminary injunction that had expired under 
its own terms on August 26, 2002, when the trial court had granted summary 
judgment on the merits had never "actually" expired because real property 
issues were "actually" still pending even though that issue had been framed 
by Judge Jackson in an order and rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
its decision. [Even Emperor Caligula, who famously wrote his decrees in 
small letters and posted them on high pillars to ensnare the Roman people, 
understood.he could not retroactively extend an expired injunction in that 
unfair fashion.]; and, [2] ordering in May of 2005 that the May 1, 2003, 
summary judgment affirmed on appeal precluded non-parties from asserting 
adverse claims even though this was contrary to law of the case created by 
Judge Medley when he dismissed claims without prejudice instead of with 
prejudice. No conclusions were entered justifying revisiting law of the case. 
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Since no URCP 60(b) motion was ever filed by Ms. Ninow within 3 
months of August 19, 2005, and since she did not cross-appeal herein, the 
trial court's order [R.2609] signed on April 26, 2005, and filed on April 28, 
2005, will now fully stand as the law of the case. The reasoning therein 
regarding lack any contempt is sound. Undeterred, Ms. Ninow has now 
continued to try to have counsel, parties, and even a non-party held in 
"contempt" for the arguments that they have made and the positions that 
they have asserted in litigation. Thankfully, no one has, at least so far, been 
held in contempt of court for making legal arguments and taking litigation 
positions, as such matters are shielded by a broad judicial privilege. The 
trial court still has pending before it contempt motions that Ms. Ninow has 
continued to file as a serial filer of contempt motions, but, very sensibly, has 
deferred them until this appeal is decided. The April 26, 2005, order is not 
challenged on appeal. It pertains to contempt and this court should order the 
trial court to entertain no contempt matters based on substantially the same 
facts. These appellants understand that this court has jurisdiction only over 
orders entered through September 15, 2005. The requested appellate order 
would instruct the trial court as to the application of April 26, 2005, law of 
the case. The appellate order is requested to end serial contempt motions. 
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The law of the case created by Judge Medley's dismissals of claims 
adverse to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment order without prejudice 
instead of with prejudice will also stand both because it is not being 
challenged on appeal and because it is sound. While that May 1, 2003, 
summary judgment [that was affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe II 
addressed only share ownership, it was supported by a rather lengthy 
recitation of numbered facts. Some of those facts were ultimate facts, some 
of them were subsidiary facts, and some of them were gratuitous facts that 
were not material to the order of summary judgment. Under URCP 7 and 
56, the facts that support a summary judgment are not deemed undisputed 
for purposes of any other order. To the extent that the facts are ultimate 
facts or subsidiary facts, they support the summary judgment. To the extent 
they are neither ultimate nor subsidiary facts, they serve no purpose, because 
they do not support the summary judgment and cannot be used to support 
any order other than the summary judgment. In Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 
UT 22; 112 P.3d 495, Justice Parrish wrote that not all facts are created 
equal: some are ultimate facts, upon which the resolution of a particular 
issue turns, while others are subsidiary facts supporting the ultimate facts. 
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The undisputed summary judgment facts in the first appeal included a 
large number of facts that were neither ultimate nor subsidiary facts, but that 
were "gratuitous" because they served no purpose as either ultimate facts or 
subsidiary facts. One of those was a finding that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose 
had been removed and replaced as officers and directors by KaLynn Ninow, 
Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl. That finding was not material to summary 
judgment, which dealt only with share ownership. It was neither an ultimate 
fact nor a subsidiary fact that supported the summary judgment. Instead, it 
was merely a "gratuitous" fact that served no purpose as to the May 1, 2003, 
summary judgment and could not be used to support any order[s] other than 
that May 1, 2003, final order. For this reason, Judge Medley declined to 
give that finding any preclusive effect over non-parties when he dismissed 
the shareholder derivative actions of Diamond Fork Land Company [which 
was not a party to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment] without prejudice. 
That law of the case [Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] stands both because 
it is correct and because Ms. Ninow has not challenged it by filing a motion 
under URCP 60(b) within 3 months of August 19, 2005, or by filing a cross-
appeal. Judge Medley was right on this issue and Judge Lewis was wrong. 
And Judge Medley's law of the case will now stand as unchallenged. 
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Further, since Judge Medley was the judge who entered both the May 
1, 2003, summary judgment as to share ownership [R.1114] affirmed in the 
prior appeal [Ninow v. Lowe Estate of Pahl, 2004 UT App. 291] and the two 
orders of dismissal "without prejudice" [Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] creating 
law of the case that the May 1, 2003, order has no preclusive effect over any 
adverse share claimants not a party to the order and no preclusive effect over 
the corporation itself, he was the judicial officer best positioned to make that 
call. Nothing in his prior orders or in the decision on appeal is contrary to it. 
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose have not claimed any personal ownership of 
shares of stock that is contrary to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment and 
have not, therefore, ever been in contempt of court to the extent the May 1, 
2003, order imposed some "duty" that they disobeyed [which is doubtful]. 
After the November 26, 2002, judgment declaring legal rights of Mr. 
Lowe and Ms. Rose as a quorum of directors was set aside on June 12, 2003, 
Diamond Fork Land Company moved to dismiss, since it had transferred its 
claims. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose have been consistent in asserting a legal 
right to serve as directors and officers until their successors are qualified, a 
posture that is consistent with the orders of dismissal "without prejudice" 
[Supp R. 376; Supp R. 385] and resulting law of the case thereby created. 
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In arguing for dismissal with prejudice, Ms. Ninow referred to the 
findings and orders in the probate proceeding and argued that they were 
binding on Diamond Fork Land Company and its successors, that William 
Lowe and Augusta Rose had been removed as directors by those findings 
and/or orders, that KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl had been 
installed in their place, and that the dismissal should therefore be made with 
prejudice. Judge Medley dismissed without prejudice and there has been no 
showing that this law of the case should now be disturbed, nor was there a 
timely cross-appeal or timely URCP 60(b) motion filed within 3 months of 
August 19, 2005 under which that law of the case may now be challenged. 
UCA Sec. 75-3-106 provides: 
"Scope of proceedings — Proceedings independent — Exception" provides 
that "(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 of this 
chapter is involved: (a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is 
independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate, (b) Petitions 
for formal orders of the court may combine various requests for relief in a 
single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted without delay." 
In dismissing Diamond Fork Land Company's suits "without 
prejudice," Judge Medley was ruling in a manner consistent with this 
provision. His May 1, 2003, summary judgment was a final, appealable 
order that concluded the entire proceeding commenced on May 29, 2002. 
Since it did not bind non-parties, it had no preclusive effect on them. 
-46-
A trial court is never free to enter orders that are contrary to law or to 
appellate law of the case. A trial court is also not free to disregard trial court 
law of the case unless the court enters conclusions that allow the trial court 
law of the case to be revisited under Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 
1034 (Utah 1995), and/or Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.3d 1306 
(Utah App. 1994). No such conclusions were entered here, and, since there 
was no timely URCP 60(b) motion filed after August 19, 2005, and there 
was no cross-appeal, the law of the case duly made by Judge Medley in his 
interlocutory dismissals without prejudice and by Judge Lewis in those parts 
of the order signed on August 16, 2005, that are not being challenged, stand* 
Ms. Ninow's pursuit of her serial contempt motions after the April 26, 
2005, Ruling and Order, and the erroneous interlocutory rulings and orders 
that arose from that pursuit, were contrary to law, contrary to appellate law 
of the case, contrary to the trial court law of the case, and contrary to the 
holding in Homeyer (In Re Cannatella) v. Stage Associates, 2006 UT App. 
89; 132 P.2d 284, that clearly prohibits orders on the "merits" in a contempt 
matter. Ms. Ninow's pursuit of post-April 26, 2005, orders made her one of 
the "indefatigable diehards" referred to in Thurston, As requested in Point 
Four, ordering a hearing on the $20,000 undertaking may help to stop this. 
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Point Four - A hearing on the TRO undertaking should be ordered. 
Judge Lewis was without discretion to deny the request for a hearing, 
since the language in URCP 65A(c)(3) is mandatory. Denying the motion 
for a hearing on April 6, 2005, was an error now ripe for appellate reversal. 
When Ms. Ninow initiated this dispute on May 20, 2002, by appearing 
ex parte before Hon. Sandra Peuler with the corporation's shareholder list, 
claiming the list was wrong, that provided no basis for issuing a TRO. A 
corporation's shareholder list establishes shareholders of record entitled to 
vote until a court in an action to which the corporation is a parity changes it. 
Because the official list had never been ordered changed by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, Ms. Ninow's attempts to unilaterally form a quorum 
to vote out the directors and install new ones was a legal nullity of no effect. 
The ground for the ex parte TRO was Ms. Ninow's assertion that the 
directors were engaged in all manner of forgery, embezzlement, misconduct, 
and destruction of records, and that an ex parte TRO without notice was thus 
needed. Judge Peuler could have bound both sides with a TRO, ordered the 
premises padlocked by a constable, and appointed a receiver and/or special 
master to sort this out. Or she could do what she did, i.e., order a $20,000 
undertaking. The ex parte allegations were never established on the merits. 
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Since Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained [both because the basis for 
the TRO was never embodied in an order on the merits and because the prior 
appeal included a reversal that scaled-back (to its original 11:00 a.m., May 
30, 2002, time and date of expiration) a TRO that had been wrongfully and 
retroactively extended by the trial court so as to "wrongfully restrain" Mr. 
Lowe under the TRO during the noon recess on May 30, 2002], Ms. Ninow 
and her husband Richard Ninow, who posted the $20,000 undertaking, have 
no good faith objection at law to having Mr. Ninow now pay the $20,000. 
Mr. Lowe promptly moved for a hearing on that undertaking shortly 
after the prior reversal and remand. That motion was denied on April 6, 
2005, in an interlocutory bench order and is now part of the pending appeal. 
Once Mr. Lowe gave Ms. Ninow actual notice that he had utilized the 
short period between expiration of the TRO at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, 
and the announcement of the preliminary injunction to reject, on behalf of 
the corporation, for want of a quorum of record shareholders, her unilateral 
attempt to vote him and the other two directors out and to replace them, she 
should have brought an action under UCA Sec. 16-10a-809, "Removal of 
directors by judicial proceeding." She would have the standing to do this 
because she controlled at least 10% of the outstanding shares of Pahl's Salt 
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Palace Loan Office, Inc., and she was alleging that "(a) the directors 
engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of authority or 
discretion with respect to the corporation; and (b) removal is in the best 
interest of the corporation." She would have been required to "make the 
corporation a party defendant." She did none of these things. Trying not to 
state the obvious, a Utah statutory mandate to make "the corporation a party 
defendant" cannot be satisfied by, instead, restraining and enjoining all the 
corporation's officers so they are unable to mount its defense or pursue its 
claims. So utilizing a TRO and preliminary injunction is the polar opposite 
of making the corporation a party defendant. The TRO allegations were 
never established on the merits and Mr. Lowe is now entitled to a hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the June 12, 2003, order, reverse the April 6, 
2005, order denying the motion for a hearing on the TRO undertaking, and 
reverse those portions of post-AQ^PRk2005, orders challenged on appeal, 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Determinative statutes and rules. 
2. May 1,2003, final order affirmed in the prior appeal. [R. 1114] 
3. October 28,2003, order in the prior appeal. 
4. September 2,2004, decision in the prior appeal. 
5. November 26,2002, default judgment. [R.3899] 
6. December 16, 2002, notice of judgment. [R.3898] 
7. March 24, 2003, opposition to motion to set aside. [R. 4032] 
8. June 12,2003, order granting motion to set aside. [R. 4053] 
9. July 2, 2003, motion to vacate June 12, 2003, order. [R. 4057] 
10. July 2,2003, affidavit in support of motion to vacate. [R. 4059] 
11. July 2, 2003, memorandum in support of motion. [R. 4061] 
Attachments to memorandum: 
A. August 14, 2002, response to document request [R. 4071] 
B. June 30,2003, letter. [R 4073] 
C. May 1, 2003, minute entry. [R. 4074] 
12. April 6, 2005, probate minutes. [R 2555] 
13. April 26, 2005, ruling and order filed April 28, 2005. [R. 2609] 
14. July 8, 2005, memorandum filed July 14,2005 [R. 3080] 
15. July 15, 2005, reply memorandum filed July 18,2005 [R. 3091] 
Attachment to reply memorandum: 
A. Letter dated July 15,2005. [R. 3097] 
16. August 16, 2005, final order filed August 19, 2005. [R. 3200] 
17. September 10,2005, withdrawal of motions as moot. [R. 3286] 
18. September 15,2005, notice of appeal. [R. 3303] 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UCA Sec. 16-10a-809. Removal of directors by judicial proceeding. 
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a corporation's 
principal office or, if it has no principal office in this state, its registered 
office is located may remove a director in a proceeding commenced either 
by the corporation or by its shareholders holding at least 10% of the 
outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that: 
(a) the director engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse 
of authority or discretion with respect to the corporation; and 
(b) removal is in the best interest of the corporation. 
(2) The court that removes a director may bar the director from reelection 
for a period prescribed by the court. 
(3) If shareholders commence a proceeding under Subsection (1), they 
shall make the corporation a party defendant. 
(4) A director who is removed pursuant to this section may deliver to the 
division for filing a statement to that effect pursuant to Section 16-10a-1608. 
UCA Sec. 75-3-106. Scope of proceedings ~ Proceedings 
independent — Exception. 
(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 of this 
chapter is involved: 
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any 
other proceeding involving the same estate. 
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various 
requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be 
finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which 
are particularly described by other sections of this chapter, no petition is 
defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the 
subject of a final order. 
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will 
may be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal 
representatives. 
(d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is 
concluded by an order making or declining the appointment. 
URAP 4(d). Additional or cross-appeal. 
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a 
notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires, 
URCP 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the 
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while 
the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate 
court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Deceased. 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26,2002 based on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of 
the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator 
for Ryan B. Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl. Also, the court considered the motions 
for competing motions for summary judgment filed by Mr. Copier on behalf of his clients. 
Appearing at the hearing was KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, Van 
Woerkom & Condie, LC, William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier, 
who appeared on behalf of his clients. The Court, having heard theL&rguments of counsel and 
1 
SfiWfVLAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clark 
/ / 
being otherwise fully and sufficiently advised, and having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Gary Pahl is GRANTED. 
2. Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., at the time of his death, and all of said 6,000 shares are part of the property belonging to the 
Estate of Gary Pahl, and to Ryan Pahl as the only devisee of the Estate. 
DATED, this the _ / _ day of _ / VUUA/, 2003. 
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In the matter of the estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased. 
Kaylinn Ninow, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah 
corporation, William Lowe, 
Augusta Rose, and Robert 
Mortensen, 
Respondents and Appellants. 
Augusta Rose, 
Third-Party Petitioner, 
v. 
Ryan Pahl, Kaylinn Ninow, 
Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-Party Respondents. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 2 8 2003 
PautetteStagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20030169-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, bench, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on Appelleexs Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, Motion for Summary Disposition, Motion to Dismiss 
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties, and Appellants'1 
suggestions of mootness and request to defer decision on 
Appellee's motions.2 
1. Robert Mortensen was dismissed from the probate proceedings 
and is not a party to this appeal. 
2, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, seeking 
(continued...) 
Appellee contends that the October 1, 2002 contempt order is 
a final order and Appellant Lowe did not timely appeal from that 
order. However, consistent with the general rule, the civil 
contempt order in this case is interlocutory. See Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167 & n.3 (Utah 1988). 
Appellee also contends that the first notice of appeal was 
not filed from a final, appealable order because the district 
court has not ruled on the ownership"of the real property. 
Appellants have filed suggestions of partial mootness but 
have not moved to dismiss any part of their appeal. Rather, they 
request this court to defer decision on Appellee's motions 
pending resolution of a motion to set aside a default ^udoment in 
a collateral action. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' request to defer 
decision is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's motion to dismiss 
Appellants' appeal, including Appellant Lowe's appeal of the 
interlocutory contempt order, is denied, and a ruling as to 
whether Appellants' appeal is taken from a final, appealable 
order is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration 
of the appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the 
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the 
appeal is taken from a final, appealable order. See In re Estate 
of Vorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties is denied. 
The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule has 
been established. 
^ Dated this p/t> day of October 2003 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
2• (•..continued) 
summary reversal. However, Appellants have withdrawn the motion. 
2 
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In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased. 
KaLynn Ninow, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
William Lowe; Augusta Rose; Robert Mortensen; and Grand Staircase 
Land Co., a Utah corporation, 
Respondents and Appellants. 
Augusta Rose, 
Third-party Petitioner, 
v. 
KaLynn Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-party Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030169-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 2, 2004) 
2004 UT App 291 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
http://www.utcourts,gov/opinions/mds/ninow090204.htm 4/25/2006 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
Attorneys: Robert H. Copier, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom and Sandra K. Weeks, Lehi, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose (collectively, Respondents) appeal 
the trial court's October 1, 2002 order determining that Lowe was in 
contempt of court and the trial court's May 1, 2003 order granting 
summary judgment in favor of KaLynn Ninow. We affirm in part, and 
reverse and remand in part. 
As an initial matter, we have determined that Respondents' appeal 
is taken from a final, appealabl€> order. See In re Estate of 
Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961). 
Respondents argue that the trial court erred in its October 1, 
2002 order by determining that Lowe was in contempt of court. 
Pursuant to rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, once a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) is granted, it 
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not 
to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the 
time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended 
for a like period or unless the party against whom the order 
is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer 
period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of 
record. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). 
The terms of the TRO in this case provided for the preliminary 
injunction hearing to be held at 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, and for 
the TRO to expire at 11:00 a.m. on the same day. The parties did not 
stipulate to an extension of the TRO; Ninow did not request that the 
trial court extend the TRO for "good cause"; and, contrary to Ninow1s 
argument, commencement of the preliminary injunction hearing one hour 
prior to the expiration of the TRO did not operate as a "good cause" 
extension of the TRO. Id. As such, under the plain language of rule 
65A(b)(2), the TRO expired at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002. Therefore, 
Lowe's actions during the noon recess of the preliminary injunction 
hearing were not in violation of the TRO.-^-
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Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that Lowe 
was in contempt of court for violating the TRO. With respect to the 
relief granted by the trial court in its October 1, 2002 order, we 
reverse only Ninow's attorney fee award.XAJ- We remand and instruct the 
trial court to order the return to Lowe of all amounts paid for 
Ninow's attorney fees awarded in connection with the trial court's 
contempt determination.-^-
Respondents also argue that the trial court erred in its May 1, 
2 003 summary judgment order by determining that Gary G. Pahl (Gary) 
owned all 6000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. (the 
Corporation) at the time of his death. More specifically, Respondents 
assert that the trial court erred by determining that, at the time of 
his death, Gary owned 3000 shares of the Corporation (the 3000 
shares) that were previously owned by Frank H. Pahl (Frank) .-^ -- Based 
upon this alleged error, Respondents argue that it was error for the 
trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Ninow. 
Pursuant to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 
judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 also provides that 
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in [rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
The 3 000 shares were the subject matter of two transfer 
agreements contained in the record before u s . — In the first 
agreement, dated May 6, 1998 (the May agreement) ,-^ - Frank agreed to 
(7) 
transfer the 3 000 shares to Gary.-— In the second agreement, dated 
December 28, 1998 (the December agreement),-^- the Corporation agreed 
to purchase the 3000 shares from Gary, so that the Corporation could 
hold them as treasury stock. In the statement of undisputed facts 
contained in Ninow's memorandum in support of her motion for summary 
judgment, she asserted that (1) the May agreement was completed and 
"paid in full," and (2) the Corporation did not make the required 
payments to Gary under the December agreement. Ninow supported these 
facts with citations to affidavits and exhibits contained in the 
trial record. Respondents did not specifically dispute these facts 
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either in their memorandum in opposition to Ninow's motion for 
summary judgment, or by way of the affidavits and exhibits cited 
therein. Because Respondents failed to "set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," the trial court was 
required to accept these facts as undisputed.-^- Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
(e); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because these undisputed facts, 
together with the plain language of both the May agreement and the 
December agreement, are determinative of Gary's. ownership of the 3000 
shares at the time of his death, summary judgment in favor of Ninow 
was appropriate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Therefore, we 
conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Gary 
owned all 6000 shares of the Corporation at the time of his death, 
and we affirm the trial court's May 1, 2003 order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Ninow.—-— 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
1. We disagree with Ninow's assertion that our holding on this issue 
will "invite judicial chaos." If a party wishes to have a TRO 
extended beyond its original terms, that party can simply seek the 
opposing party's consent to an extension, or request an extension 
from the trial court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). Ninow could have 
pursued either of these alternatives prior to or at the outset of the 
preliminary injunction hearing, but chose not to. Even if Ninow had 
been unable to secure consent to an extension from Respondents, it is 
unlikely the trial court would have denied a request to extend the 
TRO until completion of the preliminary injunction heairing. 
2. Based upon our resolution of Respondents' next argument, we affirm 
the trial court's determinations that Lowe was not entitled to the 
$7500 he obtained during the noon recess of the preliminary 
injunction hearing and that he was required to return those funds to 
Ninow. 
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3. Respondents argue that Lowe is also entitled to his reasonable 
attorney fees in opposing the contempt motion both in the trial court 
and on appeal. However, none of the legal authorities that 
Respondents have cited in support of this argument authorize an award 
of attorney fees to a party opposing a contempt motion. Therefore, we 
conclude that this argument is inadequately briefed and we do not 
address it further. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9); State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998). 
4. Respondents do not dispute that, at the time of his death, Gary 
owned the other 3 0 00 shares of the Corporation. 
5. Neither party asserts that these were not legal, binding 
agreements. 
6. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the May agreement 
is "not ambiguous, and can therefore be interpreted as a matter of 
law. » 
7. Respondents assert that the May agreement somehow "conveyed" the 
3000 shares to Lowe. However, this assertion is contrary to the plain 
language of the May agreement. The May agreement provided that Lowe 
was merely "holding" the 3000 shares until the May agreement was 
"fulfilled in whole." The May agreement also provided that it was 
"[Frank's] desire to sell [the 3000 shares] to Gary," and that upon 
"successful completion" of the May agreement, the 3000 shares would 
"belong to Gary." Accordingly, under the plain language of the May 
agreement, the trial court correctly determined that "Lowe had no 
power or authority to retain the [3 0 00 shares] in any way once the 
[May agreement] had been completed." 
8. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the December 
agreement is "unambiguous and may be interpreted as a matter of law." 
9. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly 
determined that (1) " [a]s soon as the payments had been made under 
the [May agreement], the ownership of the [3000 shares] vested in 
Gary"; and (2) because "[p]ayment was not made according to the terms 
of the [December agreement]," it "was never successfully completed 
and the [3 000 shares] could not have become treasury stock, either 
prior to, or following [Gary's] death." 
10. In their reply brief, Respondents ask this court to reverse a 
June 12, 2003 order entered in a separate civil case against Ninow. 
We do not address this argument for several obvious reasons. First, 
although the separate civil case against Ninow may have been combined 
with this case, that did not occur until nearly one year after 
Respondents filed their notice of appeal in this case; therefore, any 
proceedings in the separate civil case against Ninow are not part of 
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Respondents' appeal in this case. Also, the June 12, 2003 order was 
not entered until after Respondents1 notice of appeal was filed in 
this case. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (stating that "the notice of 
appeal . . . shall be filed . . . within [thirty] days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from" (emphasis added)). 
Finally, Respondents raised this argument for the first time in their 
reply brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c); Hart v. Salt Lake County 
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 139 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (»[B]ecause this 
argument was raised for the first time in [the] reply brief, we 
decline to address it.11). 
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Attorney for Relator 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
- IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KALYNN NTNOW, personal Civil No. 020908627 
representative of the estate of Judge Bruce C Lubeck 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default I 
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows. I 
1. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the 
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the ! 
plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows: i 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust 1500 shares (25%) \ 
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for | 
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner) j 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust 1500 shares (25%) ' 
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a 
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner) 
\ 
i 
i 
! 
i 
Third Judicial D'stnct 
2 No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default 
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares 
and fully and finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above. 
3. In the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiff s successors to the 3000 
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or 
documents to vindicate and protect the rights of plaintiffs successors to the 3000 
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents. 
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is 
hereby decreed that any and all acts, filings, and transactions purporledly made or 
entered into by or on behalf of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death 
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were 
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a 
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this 
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of 
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are 
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and voidab initio. 
5. It is further decreed that no action, filing, or transaction purportedly 
made or entered into by or on behalf of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., from 
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved 
or ratified by a board of directors upon which William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
serve as directors, until such time as their successors, if any, are duly qualified. 
6. The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
DATED THIS J ^ ^ D A Y OF N O V E M B p ^ © ^ ^ , 
BY THE (&XJ&S&®Mmt7\ ! 
ruumiey ror Keiator 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex rel DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KALYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary G Pahl, deceased, 
Civil No 020908627 
Judge Robert Hilder 
Defendant 
Default Judgment was entered herein on November 26, 2002 
A copy of the signed judgment is today served with a copy hereof upon 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
David C. Condie 
Van Woerkom & Condie 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
(Via First-Class^ U.S. Mail) 
DATED THIS 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 200 
/ 
/ 
fy°i<> 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Relator 
243 East University Boulevard - 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
- ' - " ' ' i d cour/] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD UUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAL YNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
CJA 4-501 MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
BY DEFENDANT TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020908627 
Judge Robert Hilder 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was served with process by a deputy constable and failed to 
timely respond. Defendant's default was duly entered via the entry of a Default 
Certificate by the clerk. Based on that Default Certificate, the court properly 
entered Default Judgment on November 26, 2002. Over three months elapsed 
before defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on March 17, 2003. 
POINT ONE 
Defendant's failure to file within three months is jurisdictional. 
In a unanimous Utah Supreme Court decision written by Justice Durham 
in Erickson v. Shenkers Intern. Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), a motion 
to set aside a default judgment that is entered after a Default Certificate is entered 
for failure to timely respond to a summons is an "excusable neglect" motion that 
must be filed within the three month deadline under URCP 60(b)(1). Since the 
defendant did not file her URCP 60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment 
until after the three month filing deadline set forth in URCP 60(b) had elapsed, 
this court has no authority to grant her motion. This is jurisdictional. Indeed, 
under the comparable federal rule 60(b), the grant of a motion under these 
circumstances results in a final order that is directly appealable as a matter of 
right rather than being an interlocutory order. 'There is now also substantial case 
law support for the proposition that an appeal will lie from the grant of the motion 
if the contention is that the court lacked power to grant it and not merely that it 
erred in granting the motion. [Order granting motion for relief from judgment 
would be treated as final for purposes of appeal, when new trial was challenged 
as beyond district court's authority on ground motion was not made within (the 
federal rule 60(b) deadline). Citing National Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Maylie. 910 
E2d 1181 (3rd Cir. 1990).]" Wright & Miller, Sec. 2871. As in the case at bar, 
the defendant in Erickson v. Shenkers Intern. Forwarders, supra, had appeared 
and filed papers between the time the Default Certificate was entered and the 
time that the default judgment was entered. Yet, Justice Durham wrote that the 
defendant was still required to file the motion to set aside within three months. 
Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(4), because the judgment is not 
void. Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(5), because she has not identified 
any subsequent event that has rendered prospective application of the judgment 
inequitable. See, inter alia, Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 
(Utah App. 1987). Defendant cannot use Subdivision (b)(6) to circumvent the 
applicable three month deadline. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, supra. 
This court lacks any authority to set aside the default judgment because 
the defendant failed to file a timely motion before three months had elapsed as 
required under URCP 60(b) and Justice Durham's unanimous opinion in Erickson. 
POINT TWO 
No reasonable justification or excuse for the neglect has been given. 
Justice Durham wrote in Erickson that if a motion to set aside a default 
judgment is timely filed within three months, the second test that the movant must 
satisfy is the showing of reasonable justification or excuse for failure to timely 
file a responsive pleading or responsive motion. No such showing has been 
made. Indeed, movant has failed to offer any explanation for wrhy she did not file 
on time. Any attempt to do so in a reply memorandum should be disregarded as 
untimely and going beyond the scope of matters raised within this memorandum. 
POINT THREE 
No defense of at least ostensible merit as would justify a trial of 
the issue has been raised in any proposed responsive motion or pleading. 
Under Justice Durham's unanimous opinion in Erickson. if timeliness and 
a basis for relief under URCP 60(b) are established, the third test is whether the 
defendant here has met her burden to "proffer some defense of at least ostensible 
merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised." Conspicuously absent from 
the filings made by the defendant is any proposed answer or any proposed motion 
containing a defense which may, at the option of the pleader, be raised by motion 
under URCP 12 instead of by answer. Her untimely URCP 60(b) motion repeats 
her untimely motion to dismiss in its attempts raise defenses ofres judicata, issue 
preclusion, and claim preclusion, matters which may not be raised by motion, but 
must be raised via pleading. And since the plaintiff herein was not a party to the 
probate proceeding (and the personal representative did not follow-up on initial 
limited rulings made in the probate proceeding), the orders entered in that probate 
proceeding did not involve the matters embodied in the judgment herein. Even 
though defendant has provided her prolix version of that which she claims was 
done by Judge Medley, she has provided no copies of any of his actual orders. 
Without copies of Judge Medley's actual orders, this court is not in a 
position to interpret the actual language of those orders, to measure the scope and 
reach of those orders, or to ascertain the identity of the persons and entities that 
are bound by those orders. Since neither the relator herein, Diamond Fork Land 
Company, nor the plaintiff herein, Pahi's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., were made 
parties to any probate proceeding by KaLynn Ninow, the orders entered by Judge 
Medley cannot, as a matter of law, create res judicata, issue preclusion, or claim 
preclusion in this case due to the manner in which this case was pled and due to 
the language in the default judgment entered herein. Thus, even if defendant had j 
timely filed a motion under URCP 60(b) within the required three-month period I 
(which she did not do, thereby depriving this court of the authority to grant her 
motion), and even if she had offered a reasonable excuse or explanation showing 
that her neglect in failing to respond to the summons and complaint in a timely 
manner was "excusable" neglect (which she did not do), it would still be manifest 
error for this court to grant her motion since, by failing to provide copies of the 
orders entered by Judge Medley, she has not met her burden of making a proffer 
showing that her res judicata, issue preclusion, and claim preclusion defense has 
at least ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issue she attempts to raise. 
The default judgment in this case adjudicates the claim made on behalf of 
Pahi's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., that 3000 of its shares were not the property 
of Gary G. Pahl at the time of his death and are not property of said decedent's 
estate. In the Utah Supreme Court case of In re Estate of Malliet 649 P.2d 18 
(Utah 1982), such a dispute could not have been resolved by filing and processing 
a claim against the estate under the probate code. It had to be made as part of this 
independent action against the personal representative. This was properly done. 
The default judgment entered herein is controlling and finally decides the 
issue. There is no basis in Utah law for now setting that default judgment aside. 
Wh5\ 
POINT FOUR 
Third parties who have common interests with the plaintiff and the 
relator in this matter have relied upon the default judgment entered herein. 
A related corporation and two related individuals involved in related 
litigation1 previously pending before Judge Sandra Peuler duly waited until after 
the expiration of the three-month period for filing a URCP 60(b)(1) motion in this 
case and, in reliance upon the judgment in this case and upon the failure of the 
defendant to timely move to set it aside, voluntary dismissed that other case after 
the major issues therein had been rendered moot by the judgment entered herein. 
These same third parties also elected to raise the issues pled by them 
herein as part of this independent action against the personal representative 
instead of litigating them in a probate proceeding before Judge Tyrone Medley. 
In reliance upon the default judgment entered by the court herein, they 
limited the litigation before Judge Medley to other matters and then secured a 
final judgment in their favor in the probate proceeding before Judge Medley. 
That probate proceeding is now on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
A paper containing the following language was filed in Judge Peuler's case 
and was duly served by mail upon David C. Condie on December 7, 2002: 
"Since Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., was never made a 
party to any probate proceeding before Judge Medley, it is Judge Hilder's 
final judgment that adjudicates the matters that are contained therein." 
Since the proceeding before Judge Medley and the case before Judge 
Peuler were both concluded in the trial court in reliance upon Judge Hilder's 
judgment herein, it would be very unjust to now set aside that judgment. 
1
 Counsel in this case made filings in that case, there was some overlap between 
parties, and the default judgment entered herein mooted major issues in that case. 
POINT FIVE 
The pejorative remarks included in defendant's memorandum are of 
no assistance to this court in resolving the legal issues that are present here. 
Last year the Utah Supreme Court again reminded counsel that pejorative 
remarks regarding opposing counsel are unprofessional and are of no assistance to 
the courts in resolving legal issues. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance. 2002 
UT 68, 452 Utah Adv. Rep 50. The statements accusing the undersigned of filing 
a frivolous lawsuit in order to harass the defendant do not advance the analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion to set aside the default judgment shoi/ld be DENIED. 
DATED THIS 24TH DAY OF MARCH, 2003. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing was this-day caused to be HAND-CARRIED to: 
David C. Condie 
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE 
Attornj&ys^t Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 
Sai/Lake Qty UT 84111 
DATED this 24f 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PA WAS SALT PLACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND LAND FORK 
COMPANY, A Ulah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAYLYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of (he estate of 
Gary 0 . Pahl, deceased, and 
individually, 
Defendant, 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision, The 
parlies briefed (he original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which lime the court 
mdicnlecl that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred, 
but that there might be grounds to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule 
55, i)m underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & ]i Land v. Klungervik 751 P,2d 
274 (Ut, App, 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the 
issue raised by the court. Now, haviug reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules 
as follows; 
Firsi, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v, Box Rider County and Trembly 
v. Mrs Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the 
couit is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment hns entered based on 
(ho court's bench ruling of May 2,2003, 
That is, the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or 
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any 
ono of the first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion lo 
1 
a£&3 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 020908627 
Judge Robert K. ITilder 
extend that time. 
Uul, the court is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision, Osegucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 
(February 21,2003), that Rule 60(b)(6), URCi\ provides a clear basis for relief from the default 
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the 
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default 
results solely from court error, probably even more manifestly than was the case in OsQguera* 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading 
was Uile, at the dale the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date 
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been 
filed. The responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the 
court's fault, ] The critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend" (Rule 
55(a), UUCP) at the time the default was sought. 
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no 
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and 
voidable." 751 P,2d at 277. It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable 
if I lie court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did 
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the 
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainti ff did 
not give prompt notice of the judgment. 
'Hie court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP5 
under (acts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors, 
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court: 
When the trial court's mislakes-not counsel's-are the reason a judgment is 
improvidently entered iind the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected 
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the 
mislake as soon as it is called to the court's attention. 
Id atPaiu 12, 
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6), 
URC1\ and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable 
lime after becoming aware of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is 
1
 Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a 
subject of another motion, 
2 
H£&f 
GRANTED and the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading lo which 
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks 
consolidation'of this ease with the earlier filed case before Judge Medley, that Motion must be 
directed lo Judge Medley, This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further 
Order is required. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 2003.. 
a&r**-t\+ 
t Court Judge 
VLQ&5 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 RM U • 26 
Attorney for the Relator L o ^ ~ ° 
243 East University Boulevard - 200 _ . 'J •• 'T, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 - -Z ;, , .r f. •< ^ V ^ 
Telephone 531-0099 T " _—,r~;—"" 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, TO VACATE THE ORDER 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND SETTING ASIDE THE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal Civil No. 020908627 
representative of the estate of Judge Robert Hilder 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to CJA 4-501, plaintiff moves the court to fully VACATE its 
URCP 60(b)(6) order of June 12, 2003, on the grounds that (1) the June 12, 2003, 
order's sua sponte "critical point" is clearly erroneous; (2) this court lacked the 
authority needed to enter the order; and, (3) if not vacated, the order will have a 
widespread adverse impact on the ability of national and local title insurers and 
lenders to "quiet" Utah titles utilizing the URCP 60(b)(1) three-month deadline. 
The sua sponte "critical point" that "defendant had not Tailed to plead or 
otherwise defend' (Rule 55(a), URCP) at the time the default was sought" [June 
12,2003, order, p. 2, emphasis added] is clearly erroneous. The default was 
sought several days before the defendant responded to the summons on November 
25,2002 Defendant had " 'failed to plead or otherwise defend' — (Rule 55(a), 
URCP)" when default was sought (several days prior to November 25, 2002) 
mosi 
The default certificate and default judgment were correctly entered, there 
is a sound legal basis for the default judgment, the judgment is not "improper or 
illegal, and voidable" underP & Bland, 751 P2d at 277, Oseguera v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 [February 21, 2003], is not applicable, and 
this court lacked any authority to set aside the judgment under URCP 60(b)(6). 
This court also lacks authority to set aside the judgment under URCP 
60(a), since no "clerical" error was made by the court or its clerk. It was fully 
defendant's fault that her default was entered because she did not timely "plead or 
otherwise defend" on or before November 8, 2002 and she delayed doing so until 
several days after the plaintiff sought the default. Defendant's predicament would 
have been remediable under URCP 60(b)(1), but she cannot now bring a URCP 
60(b)(6) motion she could have filed within three months under URCP 60(bXl). 
This motion is supported bya memorandum and the affidavit of counsel. 
DATED THIS /. 2003. 
OBERTJffiNRY COPIER 
ttornev/ror the Relator 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake CikaJT 84111 
(Via First-Glas\ U.S.pail) 
n 
DATED THIS (7^D/YOF: x / ^ 
q^4 
KUBbRT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for the Relator 
243 East University Boulevard - 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-0099 
C2JUL-? AMI!: 26 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF.THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER 
Civil No. 020908627 
Judge Robert Hilder 
) 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I am the attorney for the relator and have personal knowledge of the facts 
stated in this affidavit, which relate to the procedural history of this case. 
KaLynn Ninow was required to plead or otherwise defend by November 8, 
2002. I waited a reasonable amount of time after November 8, 2002, to make 
sure that the court file was up-to-date I then ascertained that KaLynn Ninow 
had not filed anything I then sought entry of defendant's default and a default 
judgment by submitting a proposed default certificate and default judgment. 
M 9 ^ 
• The proposed default certificate and default judgment were submitted by me 
to the downstairs civil clerks at the Scott M. Matheson courthouse several 
days before the clerk entered the default certificate on November 25,2002. 
DATED THIS 20TH DAY/OF JI ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public of the State 
of Utah, on this, the 20th day of June, 2003 
TWW «•*«. ,fdTh I 
30BH«n*w 28,2003 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Coudie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
(Via First-Class U.S. Mail) 
r, 
DATED THIS ^  DAY O, 
i\DUO 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 , u u . ? n 
Attorney for the Relator n- \\'/< - ° * ?i \: • i 
243 East University Boulevard - 200"' * 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 : ' 7 ; .
 : . . . 
Telephone 531-0099 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND TO VACATE THE ORDER 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, SETTING ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal Civil No. 020908627 
representative of the estate of Judge Robert Hilder 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to CJA 4-501, plaintiff has moved the court to VACATE its 
order of June 12, 2003, setting aside the default judgment under URCP 60(b)(6). 
The premise that the court itself identified as "the critical point" is clearly 
erroneous. This apparently occurred because the court raised the point for the 
first time sua sponte in its June 12, 2003, order, causing the court to make this 
erroneous "critical point" without benefit of any briefing thereof by the parties. 
This motion to vacate is made on the ground that the June 12,2003, order 
contains the erroneous sua sponte "critical point" that "defendant had not Tailed 
to plead or otherwise defend' (Rule 55(a), URCP) at the time the default was 
sought." [June 12, 2003, Order, P. 2, emphasis added]. The default was, in fact, 
sought several days before the defendant responded to the summons on November 
25, 2002. At the time the default was sought (several days prior to November 25, 
WJI 
2002), the defendant had indeed,f Tailed to plead or otherwise defend' .. .(Rule 
55(a), URCP)." Due to this, the clerk was empowered to enter the default and it 
was not an error for him to do so, there is a legal basis for the default judgment, 
the judgment is not "improper or illegal, and voidable" under P & B Land, 751 
P2d at 277, there is clearly no basis for setting aside the default judgment under 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 [February 21, 2003], 
and this court lacked the authority needed to set aside the judgment under URCP 
60(b)(6). This court also lacks authority to set aside the judgment under URCP 
60(a) because there was no "clerical" error made by the court or its clerk and it 
was defendant's fault that her default was entered because she did not timely 
"plead or otherwise defend" on or before November 8,2002 and she delayed 
doing so until several days after the plaintiff had already sought the default. 
While defendant's predicament would have been readily remediable under 
URCP 60(b)(1), she compounded her failure to timely respond to the summons 
with her failure to move under URCP 60(b)(1) within three months and she 
cannot bring a URCP 60(b)(6) motion she could have brought under URCP 
60(b)(1). The delay of several days between the time the default was sought and 
the time defendant responded makes the court's "critical point" in its order 
erroneous. The clerk was fully empowered to enter the default and actually had a 
nondiscetionary affirmative and mandatory ministerial duty to enter the default 
when it was sought by plaintiff several days prior to November 25, 2002, since 
defendant had not timely pled or otherwise defended by November 8, 2002: 
"Rule 55(a). . . requires the clerk to 'enter' the default 
when the fact of default is made known. If an answer or 
other responsive pleading or motion were due to be filed 
within a given number of days, the 'fact' of the 'default' 
would 'appear' to the clerk at the close of the last day for 
filing." Moore's Federal Practice 3rd, Sec. 55 1 l[3][a]. 
This is not a case where it has been shown that a response to a summons 
was filed prior to the time the clerk entered the default. This is a case where a 
response was due on November 8, 2002, but was filed late on November 25, 
2002. By filing late, defendant bore all the risk that her response was not in the 
court file when the clerk duly entered defendant's default on November 25, 2002. 
Since plaintiff had properly sought defendant's default several days before 
November 25, 2002, when nothing had been filed by defendant, and since the 
defendant's response was not in the court file when the clerk entered the default, it 
is of no consequence that a response was filed on November 25, 2002. It does not 
matter whether or not the response was in the building when default was entered, 
since the clerk was empowered to enter the default and properly did his duty. 
However, even though the timing of the default on November 25, 2002, 
vis-a-vis the filing of defendant's response on November 25, 2002, is not of any 
consequence, the court, in its June 12, 2003, order, states defendant's response 
"had been filed" when the default was entered. This is pure speculation by the 
court that is highly unfair to the plaintiff There is no basis for the court's 
statement in anything that has been served upon the relator or its counsel.l 
Nothing in the record establishes that defendant's response was filed 
before the clerk entered the default on November 25, 2002, or excludes the 
possibility that it was filed on November 25, 2002, after default was entered, and 
the court's speculation in this regard is highly unfair to the plaintiff and improper. 
1
 It is undisputed in the record that defendant has engaged in ex parte practice in 
this case, so relator and its counsel may not have received all of the information 
defendant has presented to the court. However, since the June 12, 2003, order 
makes no reference to a basis for the statement that defendant's response was in 
the court building when default was entered on November 25,2002, the statement 
is pure impermissible speculation by the court that is highly unfair to the plaintiff 
and is directly contrary to the presumption that the clerk's actions are valid. 
The court's improper speculation in this regard puts the June 12,2003, 
order at odds with the fundamental principle of civil procedure taught to first-year 
law students that there is a refutable presumption that the clerk performed his 
duty and a motion to challenge the clerk's actions must be brought within three 
months under URCP 60(b)(1) [or comparable shorter or longer deadlines in other 
states],- since the action by the clerk is, at most, merely voidable, and is not void. 
Since the record reveals that both the entry of default and the response by 
the defendant occurred on November 25, 2002, but does not give a time during 
that day when either occurred, the presumption applies here. This refutable 
presumption places the entry of default at some point in the day earlier than the 
filing of defendant's response. Defendant has made no contrary showing that her 
filing was attempted prior to the entry of the default, and, importantly, she had to 
do so within the three-month deadline Utah has selected under URCP 60(b)(1). 
A typical case in a typical first-year law school casebook sets this out: 
"It is well settled that in the absence of a showing to the contrary a public 
officer, such as the clerk of the court in this case, is presumed to have 
performed the duty imposed upon him by law. * * * Since the judgment 
of the lower court is merely voidable, at most, Rule 60(c) of the Arizona 
Rules of Civil Procedure prevents the defendant from attacking the 
judgment more than six months after it was entered." Udall, C J., Coulas 
v. Smith, 395 P.2d 527 (Ariz. 1964), from Cound, Friedenthal, Miller, and 
Sexton, Civil Procedure, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition, p. 792. 
Since the case at bar involves divesting and vesting of title to property, it 
is not outside of the realm of possibility that the June 12, 2003, order's failure to 
apply the three-month deadline would attract amicus attention during appeal from 
lenders and title insurers who see the June 12, 2003, order as a Utah aberration 
making it hard to quiet a Utah title in reliance on the URCP 60(b)(1) deadline.2 
Correcting the erroneous June 12, 2003, order by vacating it would solve this. 
Plaintiffs position in this case regarding this court's lack of authority to set 
aside the default judgment under URCP 60(a) because there was no "clerical" 
mistake reachable under URCP 60(a) and this court's lack authority to set aside 
the default judgment under URCP 60(b) because defendant cannot bring a URCP 
60(b)(6) motion which she could have brought under URCP 60(b)(1) but failed to 
timely do so, is a position of simplicity, integrity, clarity, and strength which has 
never been squarely met by defendant, who has not even given a good excuse for 
failing to timely respond to the summons or timely move under URCP 60(b)(1). 
Instead, defendant has responded with bitter censures and uncharitable 
imputations regarding relator and its counsel. This has apparently been done in 
order to tempt the court to torture the record and rape the law in pursuit of some 
abstract notion of fairness, equity, and justice for one Ryan Pahl which rests on 
nothing but the flimsy, frail, and feeble framework of classical human intuition. 
The court should not yield to this temptation, because even if it were to do 
so, the record and the law are surely sturdy enough to withstand such an assault 
The court earlier in this case properly granted a motion to strike the prolix 
and voluminous filings in this case by which defendant sought to divert the court's 
attention away from the record and the law in search of a result-oriented order. 
As a personal representative, KaLynn Ninow is duty-bound to honor the 
business structure left in place by Gary Pahl. Instead, she falsely claims that her 
son Ryan Pahl is a "devisee" even though there was no will and she also fails to 
recognize that Ryan Pahl is a pretermitted heir without recourse to the extent that 
Gary Pahl, while alive, divested himself of property in a corporate structure.3 
3
 Indeed, it is the rejection of the kind of ancient entitlement-by-blood claims 
made for Ryan Pahl that has allowed modern corporation law to create so much 
prosperity by placing authority in boards of directors, not in the courts or in heirs. 
KaLynn Ninow, as the mother of Gary Pahl's primogenitus Ryan Pahl, has 
aggressively pursued litigation on her son's behalf. Certainly, this must give her 
attorneys some pause, since vacating the June 12, 2003, order will effectively 
remit KaLynn Ninow to her claims for relief against her attorneys for negligence. 
No one takes any delight in seeing fellow members of the bar have their 
clients turn on them and sue them for professional negligence. And missing a 
jurisdictional deadline like KaLynn Ninow's attorneys did in this case usually 
creates a slam dunk on the issue of liability for professional negligence. While 
liability for negligence appears clear-cut in this case, the issue of damages is a 
completely different matter As to damages, there are none, because KaLynn 
Ninow would not be able to prove her "case within a case". The motions she has 
filed to date in this case lack merit and she has no meritorious defenses that she 
could raise to the claims that have now been reduced to a judgment herein. 
Thus, even though her attorneys' negligence appears clear-cut, she has 
suffered no damages, because she would not have prevailed on the merits even if 
her attorneys had timely answered or timely filed under URCP 60(b)(1). This is 
argued here, because, even though the order of June 12, 2003, does not expressly 
state that it is entered in an attempt to spare defendant's attorneys from liability 
for their professional negligence, it would be understandable if that is somewhat 
of a rationale that subtly influenced the court to enter the June 12, 2003, order. 
KaLynn Ninow's claim of entitlement to vote more than half of the shares 
of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , was duly rejected by the corporation and 
no court of competent jurisdiction has overruled the corporation in this regard.4 
No extraordinary measures are needed to protect her attorneys. 
4
 There is no basis for overruling the corporation under corporation records that 
KaLynn Ninow controls and refuses to produce for the court or counsel, using 
every legal tactic available to her to delay the production of all of these records. 
L4&M 
KaLynn Ninow, as an unjust plaintiff in any such case against her own 
attorneys [and an unjust petitioner in the original probate proceeding in which she 
never joined Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a party], has invoked the law 
in her attempt to circumvent both the corporation's records and the institutional 
memory of its directors, and she should, thus, be dealt with according to the law. 
"With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." 
KaLynn Ninow could not prevail in any action against her own attorneys 
because, in the probate proceeding, KaLynn Ninow attempted to circumvent the 
corporation's records and the institutional memory of its directors with primarily 
three affidavits (1) her own affidavit; (2) the affidavit of Frank Pahl; and (3) the 
affidavit of Robert Mortensen. In her own affidavit, she claimed to divulge the 
contents of records over which she has obtained exclusive control, but she never 
produced the records, contrary to the Utah Rules of Evidence. In the affidavit of 
Frank Pahl, KaLynn Ninow purports to prove what happened to 3000 shares of 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., stock after Frank Pahl transferred them to 
William Lowe. However, in a subsequent affidavit, Frank Pahl concedes that he 
has no personal knowledge of this [and is, thus, not a competent witness on this 
point]. In the affidavit of Robert Mortensen [who was not a director before Gary 
Pahl's death], KaLynn Ninow purports to prove that the 1500 shares sold by Robert 
Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company had been held in trust by Mortensen 
for Ryan Pahl. However, when Mortensen later provided the attached response to 
a document request [something KaLynn Ninow has fought tooth-and-nail to delay 
in doing], Mortensen admitted there were no documents creating any such trust.5 
5
 Such a trust would not have vitiated the sale to Grand Staircase Land Company, 
but would have exposed Mortensen to liability. KaLynn Ninow has no defenses 
that can work in this case and has suffered no damages from her lawyers' errors. 
The wisdom and the insight underlying the Utah Rules of Evidence is very 
apparent when one considers the completely outrageous manner in which KaLynn 
Ninow has falsely represented the contents of documents while at the same time 
refusing to turn over the documents for review by her adversaries and the courts. 
A similar phenomenon in this case has arisen in connection with the prolix 
and voluminous documents from other cases that she has dumped into the court 
file (which were properly stricken by the court) in her efforts to demonstrate that 
something took place in another case that, in fact, did not occur or, if it occurred, 
was not binding upon the persons or interests in property that she asserts it was. 
Counsel for relator has used care in identifying entities and individuals he 
represents and entities and individuals he does not represent in any given matter.6 
As an example, KaLynn Ninow adamantly insists that Pahl's Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc., and Diamond Fork Land Company were parties to the probate 
proceeding before Judge Medley. This is simply not the case. A copy of Judge 
Medley's Minute Entry Order of May 1, 2003, is annexed hereto, It clearly sets 
forth the identity of the petitioner, respondents, and third-party respondents. It is 
clear that neither Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., nor Diamond Fork Land 
Company, were parties to that action. It is particularly significant that Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., was not a party, because it means that the corporation's 
rejection of KaLynn Ninow's attempt to elect new directors because there was no 
quorum present stands and no court of competent jurisdiction has ever changed it. 
And that any finding, conclusion, or order that she owns more than half of 
the shares is simply not binding on the corporation or on the actual share owners. 
KaLynn Ninow has suffered no damages from her attorneys' neglect 
For example, see annexed letter dated June 30, 2003. 
uo(A> 
In short, the default judgment does not expose KaLynn Ninow's lawyers to 
real liability to their client for damages for their neglect. To the extent that this 
concern influenced the court's action in erroneously setting aside the judgment, it 
should no longer be of concern to the court for all of the foregoing reasons. The 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange case provides no precedent applicable 
to this case, because there was no mistake made by the court or clerk in entering 
the default and the only mistake that has been made by the court in this case is 
erroneously concluding that defendant had already responded when the default 
was sought when, in fact, default was sought several days prior to that response. 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange is a unique case limited to 
its own unique factual situation. The majority opinion in that case was obviously 
influenced by the Court of Appeals' concern that the trial judge had given an 
erroneous version of the record and that they could not affirm her version. That 
case did not involve quieting of title like this case. The URCP 60(b)(1) deadline 
of three months is very important in being able to quiet a title. The vacating of 
the default judgment was erroneous and sets a bad precedent that may draw the 
legitimate concern of financial institutions and the title insurance community. [Of 
course, the practical effect in this case is not as Draconian as it would be if this 
case involved real estate. After the November 26, 2002, judgment divested title 
to personal property located within Utah and vested it in others pursuant to URCP 
70, the property was moved out-of-state. Thus, setting aside the judgment does 
not reach those shares or their owners, since URCP 70 applied only to the original 
action of the court on November 26, 2002, an action which has not been reversed 
by setting aside the judgment because the property is now out-of-state. And in the 
period between the entry of judgment on November 26, 2002, and the entry of the 
ex parte stay of the judgment earlier this year, William Lowe and Augusta Rose, 
as corporate officers and directors, did all the relevant corporate housekeeping.] 
CONCLUSION 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange does not help the defendant in 
this case because there was no error made by the court or the clerk in entering the 
default, since the defendant had not pled or otherwise defended when default was 
sought, contrary to the clearly erroneous "critical point" made in the court's order. 
Instead, Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange actually helps 
the plaintiff herein in its sound doctrine that this court should correct its own 
errors when they are called to this court's attention, as has now been done here. 
Since this court had no authority to set aside the default judgment under 
URCP 60(b)(6), and has no authority to set aside the default judgment under 
URCP 60(a), the court should correcois error and vacate its June 12, 2003, order. 
DATED THIS ^ ^ - D A ^ Q F \ J ^ ^ / ,2003. 
LY COPIER 
for the Relator 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake CitjOJT 84111 
(Via First-(flass tf.S. Mail) 
DATED THIS A^JDAY OF 
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ty 
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James W. McConkie, III (8614) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Robert K. Mortensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
ROBERT K. MORTENSEN'S 
RESPONSES TO FIRST 
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 
Case No. 003901101 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Robert K. Mortensen hereby responds to Respondents Grand Staircase Land 
Company, William Lowe and Augusta Rose's First Request for Document Production as 
follows: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
1. All documents creating, pertaining to, memorializing, or in any way 
connected with the alleged trust, and the shares that you claim you held in trust, as referred 
to in paragraph number 8 of your affidavit dated June 25, 2002, a copy of which is annexed 
hereto and by this reference is made a part hereof. 
ANSWER: None. 
nvl 
2. All correspondence between you and/or your attorney(s) and Ryan Pahl, 
KaLynn Ninow, and/or any attorneys who represent(ed) them, including, but not limited to 
David C. Condie, Van Woerkem and Condie, or associated attorneys, that was sent or 
received between May 1, 2002 and the date of production. 
ANSWER: Those documents presently in my possession which are responsive to request 
no. 2 are attached hereto. I further reserve the right to supplement this response should I 
identify addition responsive documents in the future. 
3. All other documents pertaining to the shares of stock referred to in paragraph 
number 8 of your affidavit dated June 25, 2002, in your possession or in the possession of 
any attorney(s) who represent you or have represented you. 
ANSWER: None. However, I reserve the right to supplement this response should I 
identify responsive documents in the future. 
DATED this P day of August, 2002. 
/f /H#W^ t&UsC^t 
Robert K. Mortensen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this j±__ day of August, 2002. 
My Commjss^n^xpjres^
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I ^ T Q r W y W My Commission Expires | 3
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LAW OFFICES 
ROBERT H ENRY COPIER 
ATTORNEY & CERTIFIED PUBUC ACCOUNTANT 
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE 
243 EAST UNIVERSITY BOULEVARD - 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2803 
TELEPHONE (801) 531-7923 
24-HOUR VOICE MAIL (801) 272-2222 
FAX (801) 531-7928 
June 30,2003 
Daniel R Van Woerkom and Sandra K. Weeks 
VAN WOERKOM REED & WEEKS, L.C. 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 128 
Lehi UT 84043 
David C Condie 
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake Cit^ UT 84111 
Re: P&hV$ Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. 
Dear Messrs. Van Woerkom and Condie and Ms. Weeks: 
As you know, I have served as an attorney for William Lowe since August, 2000, and 
have served as an attorney for Augusta Rose since June, 2002, in connection with their 
positions as both officers and directors of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah 
corporation. Today is the last day of the second quarter of 2003 and I am involved in 
quarter-end housekeeping for a number of corporations and/or corporation officers and 
directors that I serve as a legal advisor In that regard, I note that you have still not yet 
provided some information that has previously been requested from you. Kindly provide 
me with copies of the front and back of stock certificates evidencing KaLynn Ninow's 
ownership of s. 
.ynn Nino 
res of the said corporation Kindly pj#vide me with the date on which 
fconveyed the beneficial ownership^! those shares to her son, Ryan Pahl. 
ugusta Rose 
1\<TV^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of : MINUTE ENTRY 
GARY G. PAHL, : CASE NO. 003901101 
Deceased- : 
KALYNN NINOW, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs • 
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY, a : 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE, 
AUGUSTA ROSE and ROBERT 
MORTENS EN, 
Respondents, 
vs • 
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW, 
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I-V, 
Third Party respondents. -: 
The personal representative's Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Summary Judgment, and 
respondent's Objections thereto are submitted to the Court for 
decision pursuant to Rule 4-501. Having reviewed all relevant 
documents, including respondent's Objections and the Reply thereto, 
the Court rules as follows. 
1. Respondent's Objections are hereby denied as without 
merit and unsupported by any cited,authority. 
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2. The Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order Granting Summary Judgment are hereby signed and entered 
without modification. 
3. This signed Minute Entry shall constitute the Order of 
the Court resolving the matter referenced herein, no further Order 
is required. 
Dated this / _day of May, 2 0CKX 
kffr^dfr 
TYRONE/E, MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT 
PAHL ESTATE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this j__ day of May, 
2003: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney for Respondents 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
David Condie 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
.3 CUMIM 
U071/ 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF GARY G. PAHL 
MINUTES 
PROBATE MINUTES 
Case No: 003901101 EF 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: April 6, 2005 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
chells 
Petitioner's Attorney: HALA L AFU JR 
RAY G MARTINEAU 
Other Parties: SANDRA K WEEKS 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER 
Video 
Tape Number: 2:07 pm 
Counsel stipulate that the summary judgment is withdrawn. Counsel 
argues the order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show 
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling. Mr 
Copier argues the issue of the undertaking. Ms Weeks gives opposing 
arguments. The Court orders the motion for the undertaking is 
denied. Mr Copier makes a motion in regards to rule 11. A rule 11 
motion has not been filed, and therefore denied. Mr Copier makes a 
motion in regards to the ruling on 6/12/03 be vacated. The Court 
orders the motion to vacate is denied. Ms Weeks makes a motion to 
stay any remaining pending motions until a ruling on the order to 
show cause. Mr Copier stipulates to the motion. 
Page 1 (last) 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondent William Lowe 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of RULING AND ORDER 
GARYG.PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
KALYNN NINOW, personal representative 
of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and guardian 
and conservator of the Estate of Ryan B, Pahl, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE, 
and ROBERT H. COPIER, 
Respondents. 
Having taken certain matters under advisement at a hearing on April 6, 
2005, the court now rules thereon and enters this order. As all other matters that 
have been brought by any party under this probate number have now been ruled 
upon or withdrawn, this shall constitute the final order as to all claims and all 
parties to any and all probate proceedings pending under this probate number. 
The court has now read the written response to the order to show cause that 
was filed by William Lowe prior to the April 6, 2005, hearing that the court had not 
yet seen at the time of the hearing. The court has also read Lowe's answer and jury 
-Z&0? 
By. 
APR 2 8 2005 
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demand dated April 19, 2005, and Lowe's motion and memorandum dated April 
19, 2005, seeking an evidentiary trial separate from the other named respondents. 
The court has also read the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Ninow 
v. Lowe, 2004 UT App 291, wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated "we reverse 
the trial court's determination that Lowe was in contempt of court for violating the 
TRO." [See Ninow v. Lowe, 2004 UT App 291; Page 3 of 6; Paragraph L] 
The court is persuaded that Lowe would be entitled to an evidentiary trial 
before another such determination that Lowe is contempt of court could be entered 
against him. The court is further persuaded that even if everything that KaLynn 
Ninow, the petitioner, has presented to the court, or could present to the court, and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are viewed in the light that is most 
favorable to Ninow, this court is unable to conclude that Lowe has disobeyed any 
"judgment, order or process of the court" [UCA Sec. 78-32-1(5)] or that Lowe 
engaged in any of the other acts or omissions constituting contempt enumerated in 
Section 1 of Chapter32 of Title 78 of the Utah Code [2005]. Therefore, the court 
is persuaded that it is proper to dismiss this proceeding as to Lowe without the need 
to conduct an evidentiary trial Petitioner has also named Augusta Rose as one of 
the respondents in this proceeding. While she has not yet been served with an 
order to show cause and is not yet before the court, the court concludes that her 
involvement in any alleged contempt, if any, did not include some of the acts that 
were alleged against William Lowe, and that this proceeding should be dismissed as 
to Rose for the same reason that it is being dismissed as to Lowe. Petitioner has 
also named Robert Henry Copier, counsel for Lowe in this proceeding and counsel 
for Lowe and Rose in other matters, as a respondent. Copier has not been served 
with an order to show cause and is not yet before the court as a party. Having now 
concluded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Lowe and Rose, the court 
is persuaded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Copier as well. It is 
-7Ju?\0 
further noted by the court that Copier represented other clients in proceedings 
under this probate and in other civil cases who were not parties to any preliminaiy 
injunction, that Copier was not a party to any preliminary injunction, and that there 
has been no showing that Lowe and Rose had the right to exercise control over 
Copier's other clients or to direct Copier in his representation of those clients. It is 
also noted that Copier's activities as an attorney of record in litigation are subject to 
privileges and immunities for activities undertaken in the course of litigation. For 
all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the above-entitled proceeding 
styled as KaLynn Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, and Robert H. Copier, 
is hereby DISMISSED. It appears that all other proceedings that were previously 
pending under this probate number have also been concluded, and that Lowe and 
Rose withdrew all other matters in which they sought affirmative relief, giving as 
their reason the following three factors: [1] the court, as of April 6, 2005, has now 
ruled upon Respondents' Motion to Vacate Order Setting Aside Default Judgment; 
[2] Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and has had a reasonable amount of 
time to dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property; and [3] the 
Utah corporation Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., has now ceased business 
operations and the land and buildings under its control have been sold, stripping the 
corporation of any value. It is noted that Ninow is still the guardian of Ryan Pahl 
even though Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and that William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose have claimed herein that they had hoped to prevent Ninow from 
closing down the business operations and selling the land and buildings until Ryan 
Pahl reached the age of majority and had had a reasonable amount of time to 
dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property. It is noted that 
Ninow has been engaged in litigation over property with extended Pahl family 
members other than Lowe and Rose and that said protracted litigation was only 
recently resolved without any adjudication on the merits from any trial court. Any 
delay experienced by Ninow in selling the land and buildings was not solely a result 
of litigation in which only Lowe, Rose, and/or Copier were involved with her as 
parties or counsel. She has been able to close down the business operations of 
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and sell the land and buildings in which those 
business operations were conducted without any court order on the merits in any of 
the litigation in which she was involved with Lowe, Rose, and their counsel Copier, 
and litigation with Pahl family members independent of Lowe, Rose, and Copier. 
Accordingly, this final order dismissing the proceeding styled as KaLynn 
Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, and Robert H. Copier concludes all 
litigation now pending or that had been pending under Probate No. 003901101. 
DATED THIS 2 ^ DAY OF APRIL, 2005. 
BY Tm COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing [proposed] ruling and order was this-day mailed to: 
Daniel Van Woerkom/gandra jWeeks/Hala Afu 
2975 West Executiv^TarkwayJ, Suite 414 
Lehi UT 84043 
DATED THIS 21ST DA^ OF APRHi 
By—., 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 4 2000 
SALT LAK£= COUNTY 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom (USB #8500) 
Sandra K. Weeks (USB #8491) 
Hala L. Afu (USB #8967) 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Telephone: (801) 407-8330 
Facsimile: (801) 407-8331 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and 
as Guardian and Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKJE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
KALYNN NINOW, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gary 
Gunther Pahl and as Guardian and 
Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE, 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 
Respondents, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR A STAY 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Lewis 
Kalynn Ninow, by and through her above named counsel, hereby responds to the 
Respondents' motion (dated June 24, 2005) for a stay of contempt proceedings as follows. 
"^pDOdD 
1. The Motion to Stay should be denied as the contempt proceeding is the only remaining 
matter in which Respondents' have an interest in this case. Once the issue of contempt is 
decided, this probate case will be able to move speedily toward conclusion. 
2. The Motion to Stay should be denied as Respondents have already requested and were 
granted one continuance of the contempt hearing from June 29, 2005, to July 21, 2005. 
The July 21, 2005 date was selected by Respondents' counsel. Any further delays will 
substantially prejudice Petitioner in her efforts to conclude this matter. 
3. There is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as the record in this case clearly 
shows that Respondents have been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office 
and that they have no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. 
4. The preliminary injunction entered in this case should be converted to a permanent 
injunction as prayed in the contempt pleadings filed and on record in this matter. Any 
stay of the contempt proceedings will prejudice Petitioner in her attempts to protect the 
estate from Respondents' repeated and continual attempts to improperly exercise control 
over the assets of the estate. 
Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that Respondents' motion for a stay be denied 
in full and that the contempt proceeding on July 21, 2005 be heard as scheduled. 
2 
^ 
DATED thisX; day of July, 2005. 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
Hala L. Afu 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the jy day oi July, 2005,1 placed in the mail, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing addressed as follows: 
Robert Copier 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
"3C^Z 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 j y ^ \ g gQDS 
Attorney for Respondents 
SALT LAKH COUNTY William Lowe and Augusta Rose SAiTiAgEj 
"IW«HWWBIrfT«nWi rTi ft 
East 400 South Peputy Clark 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of REPLY MEMORANDUM OF 
AUGUSTA ROSE IN SUPPORT 
GARY G. PAHL, OF HER MOTION FOR A STAY 
Deceased. Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased 
[Ninow v. Lowe II (Estate of Pahl)] 
KaLynn Ninow 
Petitioner 
vs. 
William Lowe, Augusta Rose, Robert H. Copier, 
and Diamond Fork Land Company, Inc. 
Respondents 
Augusta Rose 
Counter-petitioner, Cross-petitioner, and Third-party Petitioner 
vs. 
KaLynn Ninow, DDTS Properties LLC. Cathy Jean Libia Cherri Lynn Butters, 
Joan Christensen Bastemeyer, Susan Lily Pahl Viklund, Lois Frank Pahl Koford, 
Gloria Pamela Pahl Ewell, Ryan Pahl, and John/Jane Does 7-10, 
individually and as personal representatives and guardians of the estates 
and/or persons of Ryan Pahl, Gary G. Pahl, and/or A. Gunther Pahl 
Third-party Respondents 
Tr£ft\ 
Augusta Rose replies in support of her motion to stay by quoting from 
KaLynn Ninow's memorandum and then giving her specific reply to each sentence. 
"1. The Motion to Stay should be denied as the contempt proceeding is 
the only remaining matter in which Respondents have an interest in this case." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Based on this new admission by KaLynn 
Ninow, KaLynn Ninow should immediately release Augusta Rose as a party to 
KaLynn Ninow's May 29, 2002, petition [Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of PahT)], 
leaving only Augusta Rose's counterclaims/third-party claims for defamation in that 
proceeding. Ms. Ninow previously made this same admission in correspondence 
between counsel, but then retracted it. Now that she has made it in a public court 
filing, it is operative and the estoppel that was created by the preliminary injunction 
will be eliminated by lifting the injunction. Until this admission was formally made 
on July 8, 2005, KaLynn Ninow was estopped from asserting that William Lowe 
and Augusta Rose had been removed as officers and directors of PahTs Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc., because (1) she was still keeping them under the preliminary 
injunction; (2) she claimed that she was doing so to pursue litigation as to which the 
preliminary injunction should stay in place; (3) if William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
had been removed as officers in May of 2002, there would be no need for such 
litigation as to respondents after August of 2002 and no need for the preliminary 
injunction. Now that KaLynn Ninow admits that William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
have no interest in the May 29, 2002, petition, there is no longer a basis for keeping 
the preliminary injunction in place, since nothing further will be litigated on the 
merits as to William Lowe and Augusta Rose and their removal as officers is 
operative as of July 8, 2005. Had KaLynn Ninow made this important admission 
earlier, lifted the preliminary injunction, and withdrawn her assertion that the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in August of 2002 was only a partial one as to 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose after the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the May 
15 2003, order in which they were interested, the estoppel would have ended much 
sooner and the entire matter would have been ended no later than April 6, 2005.1 
"7 (continued). Once the issue of contempt is decided, this probate case 
will be able to move speedily toward a conclusion." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: The outcome of the contempt proceeding 
is irrelevant to other matters in this probate and the ruling on contempt, whether 
favorable or unfavorable to Ms. Ninow, has no bearing on her ability to move this 
probate case to a conclusion, speedily or not. After securing a ruling from this 
court that the May 1, 2003,Wder on her May 29, 2002, petition was a "partial" 
summary judgment on her May 29, 2002, petition, Ms. Ninow has now admitted, 
effective July 8, 2005, that William Lowe and Augusta Rose have no interest in her 
May 29, 2002, petition. This exposes that her use of that petition as a pretext for 
keeping Augusta Rose under an injunction was a sham and a fraud on the court and 
confirms Augusta Rose's contention that Ms. Ninow would never actually pursue 
her May 29, 2002, petition against Augusta Rose beyond the May 1, 2003, order. 
"2. The Motion to Stay should be denied as Respondents have already 
requested and were granted one continuance of the contempt hearing from June 
29,2005, to July 21, 2005." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: The prior continuance was appreciated by 
counsel for Augusta Rose. The prior continuance is irrelevant l< > the ground for the 
motion for a stay. That ground is that the evidentiary hearing on alleged contempt 
will be more efficient if all matters on the merits have first been concluded. There 
has already been great confusion in this case in failing to discern the distinctions 
1
 KaLynn Ninow is attempting to have the court hold Augusta Rose in contempt 
for arguments made in litigation. It is necessary to remake those arguments to show 
that they were not made in "knowing" and "willful" disobedience of a duty imposed 
by a court order. The arguments are not being renewed for purposes of the merits. 
between arguments being made in opposition to contempt and arguments being 
made on the merits. By concluding everything going to the merits first, the court 
will be simplifying the contempt proceeding and will be limiting it to only contempt. 
"2 (continued). Any farther delays will substantially prejudice Petitioner 
in her efforts to conclude this matter." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: KaLynn Ninow has identified no specific 
substantial prejudice that she will endure if the court requires her to first speedily 
conclude matters remaining under her May 29, 2002, petition before litigating the 
contempt hearing. Indeed, requiring this may help spur Ms. Ninow into action. 
"3. There is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as the 
record in this case clearly shows that Respondents have been removed as officers 
and directors of the Loan Office and that they have no authority to act on behalf 
of the Loan Office." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Augusta Rose agrees that effective July 8, 
2005, from and after April 6, 2005 [the date2 of this court's denial of the motion to 
vacate the June 12, 2003, order], the record in this case shows that respondents 
hmc been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they teve 
2
 William Lowe and Augusta Rose asked the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise its 
discretion to review the June 12, 2003, order as part of the appeal, since the case in 
which that order had been entered was consolidated into Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate 
ofPahD while that proceeding was on appeal. In its decision, the Utah Court of 
Appeals [1] scaled-back the TRO to its stated 11:00 a.m expiration time; [2] ruled 
that William Lowe was not in contempt of court; [3] reversed the award of attorney 
fees; [4] affirmed the May 1, 2003 summary judgment on alternative grounds (the 
probate court had based the May 1, 2003, summary judgment on its ruling that the 
"December agreement" was void ab initio while the Utah Court of Appeals deemed 
the "December agreement" to be fully "valid" and "binding" and also determinative 
of share ownership and that Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares at death); and, [5] 
ruled William Lowe was not entitled to keep the $7500 based on the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmance of the May 1, 2003, summaiy judgment on these alternative 
grounds. The Utah Court of Appeals then declined to address the June 12, 2003, 
order. For this reason, there was a delay until April 6, 2005, to get a final ruling. 
no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. Because removal of respondents 
as officers and directors constitutes an adequate remedy at law, there is no legal 
basis to keep them under preliminary injunction in the face of the said legal remedy. 
"4. The preliminary injunction entered in this case should be converted 
to a permanent injunction as prayed for in the contempt pleadings filed and on 
record in this matter," 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Augusta Rose agrees that the contempt 
pleadings filed by KaLynn Ninow pray for a permanent lnjiitu lion Becaxxse this is 
relief going to the merits rather than contempt-type relief, it was proper for Augusta 
Rose to plead under URCP 7(a) and 8 in response to KaLynn Ninow's contempt 
pleadings. But no permanent injunction can be granted as part of the upcoming 
evidentiary hearing on contempt because a permanent injunction is relief on the 
merits that does not turn on whether or not Augusta Rose is in contempt of court. 
Regardless of whether or not Augusta Rose is in contempt of court, a 
permanent injunction should only be entered if the remedy at law is not adequate. 
Because the removal of William Lowe and Augusta Rose as officers and 
directors [as has now been effectively accomplished fronpmnd after April 6, 2005, 
effective July 8, 2005] is an adequate remedy at law that fully protects KaLynn 
Ninow's rightful interests, there is no legal basis for issuing a permanent injunction. 
"4 (continued). Any stay of the contempt proceeding will prejudice 
Petitioner in her attempts to protect the estate from Respondentsf repeated and 
continual attempts to improperly exercise control over the assets of the estate." 
REPLY BY AUGUSTA ROSE: Having been removed as an officer and 
director, Augusta Rose asserts no right to exercise control over the assets of the 
estate, she is not engaged in any attempt to exercise control over any such assets, 
and she will not do so absent further court order providing a basis for her to do so. 
Her pending defamation and unjust enrichment claims seek no such order. 
CONCLUSION 
If anything, KaLynn Ninow's memorandum of July 8> 2005, shows how 
confusing it is for her to try to mix a contempt proceeding with the merits. Based 
on this, it will be helpful if the court stays the evidentiary hearing on contempt until 
KaLynn Mnow first wraps up everything on the merits and advises the court she 
has done so. At that point, a contempt hearing can be efficient, fair, and orderly. 
The admission made in the first sentence is extremely helpful in bringing the 
proceedings under this probate number to a close. KaLynn Ninow's interests are 
fully protected by the removal of Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers and directors. 
The admission confirms Augusta Rose has no interest in the May 29, 2002, 
petition. Based on her own admission, KaLynn Ninow should move to promptly 
release Augusta Rose from the May 29, 2002, petition and lift the injunction./ The 
motion for a stay should be QRANTiD to help $p Ms. Ninow into taking action. 
DATED THIS 15TH DAY O^ JULYJ 
ROBERT IffiN^Y COPIER 
Attorney to/ William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
True copies of the foregoing were mailed on July 15, 2005, to 
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
LehiUT 8404$ 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow ^ v Ray Martineau 
/ \ 3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
David Scofieid and Ronald Piice \ Salt Lake City UT 84106 
111 East Broadway, Suite 340 \ AttorneyMr Cathy Jean Libin 
SLCUT 84111 I \ ondCf^rffLyknBtitters / 
Attorneys for DDTS Propertied LLC 
^ ° f Q > 
LAW OFFICES 
R OBERT H ENRY V^OPIER 
ATTORNEY AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
TAX COURT BAR NUMBER CR4093 
COLORADO BAR NUMBER 36469 
UTAH BAR NUMBER 727 
MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. BEFORE THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN DENVER. COLORADO. AND BEFORE ALL 
FEDERAL AND STATE TRIAL COURTS AND APPELLATE COURTS VENUED IN COLORADO AND UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY MAIL SALT LAKE (801) 531-0099 
17 EAST 400 SOUTH DENVER (303) 337-0099 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 TOLL FREE (888) 737-0099 
July 15, 2005 
Augusta Rose 
7179 South 350 East 
Midvale UT 84047 
William T. Lowe 
3939 South Alberly Way 
Salt Lake City UT 84124 
Re: Estate of Gary G Pahl 
Dear Augusta and Bill: 
KaLynn Ninow has now formally admitted that you have no interest in her May 29, 2002, 
petition. This vindicates our prediction that she would not pursue that petition against you 
beyond the May 1, 2003, summary judgment. In my opinion, this admission also means 
that your removal as officers and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., will be 
effective as to Ms. Ninow once Ms. Ninow has Judge Lewis lift the preliminary injunction. 
I now advise you that, based on this July 8, 2005, admission by Ms. Ninow, once the 
preliminary injunction is lifted, you will have been effectively removed as officers and/or 
directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and will lack any authority to control it or 
to exercise the rights of seisin and possession over any assets controlled by the corporation. 
On another subject, you know that I asked opposing counsel to stipulate to continuing the 
July*21, 2005, hearing before Judge Lewis in this probate and have asked my opponents in 
three other cases for the same courtesy as to matters set on July 21 and 22, 2005, so I can 
help a dear out-of-state friend with transportation and emotional support as she undergoes 
"*h£9"7 
Augusta Rose 
William T. Lowe 
July 15, 2005 
Page Two 
surgery to remove a lymph node in order to study it for cancer. This arose as the result of 
a mammogram taken after the July 21, 2005 hearing had already been set. So far, all of 
the opposing attorneys in the other cases have graciously agreed to continuances. [One 
before Judge Lewis in which I represent a criminal defendant; one before Judge Himonas 
in which I represent a blind mother who I am defending against the petitioner's post-trial 
efforts to set aside the grant of joint legal and physical custody that I secured for her in a 
trial before Judge Noel; and one before U.S. District Judge Sam in which I represent one 
of the defendants in a corporate civil action set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. on July 21, 2005.] 
I am unable to predict whether Ms. Ninow's counsel will extend similar courtesy, and, if 
not, whether Judge Lewis will grant my continuance request without such an agreement by 
opposing counsel. I will keep you posted on this and I will let you know as soon as I know. 
Iliank you for giving me the opportijriity to serve as your attorney. 
Third Judic'?! Oisfrict 
AUG 19 2805 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents 7*C^ 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose Deputy cierk" 
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose] 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of FINAL ORDER ON THE 
MAY 29, 2002, PETITION 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased 
[Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of Pahl)] 
KaLynn Ninow 
Petitioner 
vs. 
William Lowe. Augusta Rose, Robert Mortensen, 
and Grand Staircase Land Company, Inc. 
Respondents 
Augusta Rose 
Third-party Petitioner 
vs. 
Ryan Pahl, KaLvnn Ninow. Richard Ninow, and Does I-V 
Third-party Respondents 
Kalynn Ninow having admitted by written filing dated July 8, 2005, that she 
will not pursue the merits of her May 29, 2002, petition beyond the May 1, 2003, 
order granting summary judgment, the court, being sufiBciently advised, ORDERS: 
"b"2CO 
1. All remaining claims under the May 29, 2002, petition are dismissed. 
2. William Lowe and Augusta Rose are hereby ordered removed as officers 
and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and, as they have no authority 
over Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., by virtue of this removal, the preliminary 
injunction that was entered in connection with the May 29, 2002, petition is lifted. 
3. Augusta Rose's defamation claims against KaLynn Ninow and Ryan Pahl 
remain pending. The judgment and permanent injunction against Richard Ninow 
in favor of Augusta Rose entered by Judge Tyrone E. Medley remain in full effect. 
4. All unadjudicated URCP 11 motions remains pending. 
DATED THIS / t y ^ ¥ * § g ^ U G U S T , 2005. 
IT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of this [proposed] order was mailed on August 12, 2005, to 
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu 
2975 West/Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi UT M043 \ 
Attorney^ for KaLynp Ninoy/ 
ROBERT IffiNRY COPIEI 
^tomeyjfetfwMam Lowe and Augusta Rose 
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose] 
~^->-7ol 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 ' ; hi £ j . 
Attorney for Respondents 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose ,; /
 y I 
17 East 400 South : . &Zl 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 :^f^— 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of WITHDRAWAL OF MOTIONS 
[AS HAVING BECOME MOOT] 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased 
[Ninow v. Lowe I (Estate of Pahl)] 
KaLynn Ninow 
Petitioner 
vs. 
William Lowe. Augusta Rose. Robert Mortensen, 
and Grand Staircase Land Company, Inc. 
Respondents 
Augusta Rose 
Third-party Petitioner 
vs. 
Ryan Pahl. KaLynn Ninow. Richard Ninow, and Does I-V 
Third-party Respondents 
The court entered her final order on the May 29, 2002, petition on August 
19, 2005. The ten days for moving for a new trial or to amend under URCP 59(a) 
and (b) and/or (e) expired September 2, 2005. KaLynn Ninow did not file a timely 
URCP 59 motion on or before September 2, 2005, and, as of September 9, 2005, 
no such motion appears in the docket. The following motions are now withdrawn 
by the moving part[ies] as having been mooted by the August 19, 2005, final order: 
#
 Motion to Set Jury Trial filed on August 25, 2005. 
• Lowe's URCP 41(b) Motion for Final Order Dismissing the May 29, 2002, 
Petition as to the Respondents Lowe and Rose filed on August 25, 2005. 
* Motion to Reverse th/April \2005, Ruling Rei/Q^seguera Order filed on 
September I, 200$ 
DATED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of hereof was mailed on September 10, 2005, to 
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu 
2975 West Esfecutiv<\Parkway, Suite^414 
. Lehi UT 84043 
Attorneys foi KaLynn\Ninow 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents/Appellants 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DEPARTMENT 
In the matter of the estate of NOTICE OF APPEAL 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Respondents William Lowe and Augusta Rose, through their attorney, 
Robert Henry Copier, appeal from the Third District Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court the Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition signed by the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on August 16, 2005, and entered on August 19, 
2005, together with all prior orders entered under or consolidated into this 
probate or any proceeding therein that have not previously been reviewed on 
the merits by an appellate court, including, but not limited to, the order by 
Judge Hilder setting aside the default judgment, the order by Judge Lewis 
denying the motion to vacate the order by Judge Hilder setting aside the 
default judgment, the order denying the motion to proceed against the surety 
who made the TRO undertaking, and all orders and rulings extending the 
preliminary injunction beyond the grant in 2002 of the summary judgment 
adjudicating the underlying merits of the May 29, 2002, probate petition. 
By 
S P 1 5 2005 
SALT LAKE pOfJNl 
Deputy Clerk 
A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to: 
DANIEL VAN WOERKOM 
SANDRA WEEKS 
HALA AFU 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, PC 
2975 WEST EXECUTIVE PARKWAY - 414 
LEHI, UTT84043-0255 
-TH DATED THIS 15 m DAY/OF SEPTEMBER, 200 
